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INTRODUCTION
Every American deserves the freedom and opportunity to
dream the same dreams, chase the same ambitions, and
have the same shot at success[.] A growing number of Americans recognize that their LGBT[Q+] family members, friends,
and neighbors deserve to be treated like everyone else in the
United States. Yet today in America, in the majority of states,
LGBT[Q+] Americans live without the protection of fully-inclusive non-discrimination laws. I believe America is ready to
take the next steps forward in the march for fairness, equality, and opportunity for every American. It is time to take
bold legislative action.1
- U.S. Senator Tammy Baldwin

Although the United States has made great strides toward
equality for its LGBTQ+ citizens in recent years, South Africa
has demonstrated far greater progress concerning equal protection and employment non-discrimination of its LGBTQ+ citizens. The South African Constitution, for example, expressly
prohibits all unfair discrimination on the basis of sex, gender,
or sexual orientation, whether the government or a private
party committed it. In December 2005—a whole decade before
Obergefell v. Hodges2—the South African Constitutional Court
handed down Minister of Home Affairs v. Fourie, a landmark
decision that legalized marriage equality.3 Moreover, unlike
the United States, South Africa has federal laws that prohibit
employment discrimination against its LGBTQ+ citizens and
provide them with robust workplace protections.
This Note contends that employment non-discrimination
laws and workplace protections for LGBTQ+ citizens in the
United States are woefully inadequate. Although some states
1
Press Release, U.S. Senator Tammy Baldwin, Historic Comprehensive
LGBT Non-Discrimination Legislation Re-Introduced in Congress (May 2, 2017),
https://www.baldwin.senate.gov/press-releases/equality-act-2017 [https://
perma.cc/X8UR-ASW5].
2
135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
3
2006 (1) SA 524 (CC) (S. Afr.).

R
R
R
R
R
R
R
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afford robust protections for those who reside within their borders, many states do not.4 This results in a legal system in
which some citizens are protected by law against employment
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation and gender
identity while others are not. “[E]qual dignity in the eyes of the
law”5 cannot and should not depend on one’s zip code. Thus,
this Note further contends that the U.S.’ lawmakers and policymakers should look to South Africa as a model for implementing federal laws that prohibit employment discrimination
against LGBTQ+ citizens and provide substantial workplace
protections.6
Although it is unlikely that the U.S. Constitution will be
amended to join the South African Constitution in prohibiting
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation or gender
identity,7 there are other avenues to provide equally robust
workplace protections for LGBTQ+ individuals. Perhaps the
most promising avenue is federal legislation that mirrors South
African laws.8 Indeed, members of Congress have proposed
pieces of legislation that would effectuate significant progress
in this area of the law.9 But not all of the proposed pieces of
4

See infra subpart II.A.
Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2608.
6
Other commentators have also advocated that the United States’
lawmakers and policymakers should look to South Africa as a model for protecting the rights of LGBTQ+ citizens. See, e.g., Eric C. Christiansen, Exporting South
Africa’s Social Rights Jurisprudence, 5 LOY. U. CHI. INT’L L. REV. 29, 41 (2007)
(“[The South African social rights jurisprudence model] is exportable to other
nations seeking to enforce enumerated socio-economic rights because South Africa has created its affirmative social rights jurisprudence that internalizes country-specific justiciability concerns.”); Lisa Newstrom, Note, The Horizon of Rights:
Lessons from South Africa for the Post-Goodridge Analysis of Same-Sex Marriage,
40 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 781, 803–04 (2007) (“Until American judges and lawmakers
are willing to learn from Fourie’s analysis by adapting and improving upon it . . .
the balance will remain skewed against same-sex families before the doors to the
courtroom even open.”).
7
Cf. Rick Jervis, Voices: Constitutional Convention an Unlikely Reality, USA
TODAY (Jan. 26, 2016, 12:17 PM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/opinion/
voices/2016/01/26/voices-constitutional-convention-greg-abbott/78849240/
[https://perma.cc/AU84-BWKA] (“It’s hard to imagine 34 states deciding on any
one thing. Getting 38 of them to agree on a single amendment seems like an
impossible dream.”); Thomas F. Schaller, The End of Amendments?, U. OF VA. CTR.
FOR POL. (Mar. 27, 2014), http://www.centerforpolitics.org/crystalball/articles/
the-end-of-amendments/ [https://perma.cc/V4N5-FARH] (“[T]he fact is plans to
amend the Constitution are mostly a waste of time because, other than a widely
popular and highly-unifying suggested change, it is probably almost impossible to
ratify or even propose amendments in our highly-polarized nation and divided
national government.”).
8
See infra subpart I.C.
9
See infra Part IV.
5
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legislation are adequate.10 The United States should strive to
implement non-discrimination laws and workplace protections
that are equally as forceful as those in South Africa. The
Equality Act, rather than the Employment Non-Discrimination
Act, is therefore the better piece of proposed legislation to
adopt. In the absence of federal non-discrimination laws and
workplace protections, each state should continue to “serve as
a laboratory” and “try novel . . . experiments.”11 Additionally,
Fortune 500 companies should continue to lead the way in the
private sector by providing substantial workplace protections
to their LGBTQ+ employees.12
In Part I, this Note reviews South African non-discrimination and equal-protection law and jurisprudence by discussing
the South African Constitution, landmark Constitutional Court
cases, and significant legislation. The cornerstone of South
African non-discrimination and equal-protection law and jurisprudence is the Bill of Rights, which explicitly protects
LGBTQ+ South Africans from discrimination. The government
has reaffirmed the Constitution’s commitment to equal rights
for LGBTQ+ South Africans through court decisions and acts of
Parliament. This Note argues that South Africa’s progressive
non-discrimination and equal-protection legal regime should
serve as a model for the United States, which currently lags
behind much of the Western democratic world.
In Part II, this Note assesses the current state of non-discrimination and equal-protection law and jurisprudence in the
United States. Some states have stringent employment nondiscrimination laws and provide robust workplace protections
to its LGBTQ+ citizens. But other states have no workplace
protections for its LGBTQ+ citizens. And on the federal level,
there is no legislation prohibiting employment discrimination
based on sexual orientation or gender identity in the private
sector.
10
Cf. Ed O’Keefe, Gay Rights Groups Withdraw Support of ENDA after Hobby
Lobby Decision, WASH. POST (July 8, 2014, 4:37 PM), https://
www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-politics/wp/2014/07/08/gay-rightsgroup-withdrawing-support-of-enda-after-hobby-lobby-decision/?utm_term=
.C6589d4152d6 [https://perma.cc/6BMP-R86S] (“The bill’s religious exemptions
clause is written so broadly that ‘ENDA’s discriminatory provision, unprecedented
in federal laws prohibiting employment discrimination, could provide religiously
affiliated organizations . . . a blank check to engage in workplace discrimination
against LGBT[Q+] people . . . .’”).
11
New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting).
12
See infra subpart IV.C.
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In Part III, this Note considers the extension of the protections included in Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to
LGBTQ+ individuals. The Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission has adopted this approach. The federal courts,
however, have been more reluctant to do so because the Supreme Court has not expressly decided the issue. Indeed, the
Supreme Court recently denied a petition for writ of certiorari
in a case dealing with employment discrimination on the basis
of sexual orientation and gender identity.
In Part IV, this Note discusses two proposed pieces of federal legislation that address employment discrimination based
on sexual orientation and gender identity. Although LGBTQ+
advocacy organizations and their allies once supported the Employment Non-Discrimination Act, they have since withdrawn
their support for the Act because of its modesty. The better
piece of legislation, this Note argues, is the Equality Act. The
Equality Act extends Title VII’s protections to LGBTQ+ individuals and better follows the non-discrimination and equal-protection law and jurisprudence of South Africa.
I
SOUTH AFRICAN NON-DISCRIMINATION LAW AND
JURISPRUDENCE
A. The South African Constitution
After South Africa dismantled its apartheid regime, the
country adopted a “new and powerful constitution that provide[s] protections for individual rights and remedies for their
violation.”13 Chapter 2 of the South African Constitution includes the Bill of Rights, which “enshrines the rights of all
people in [South Africa] and affirms the democratic values of
human dignity, equality and freedom.”14 The South African
Constitution not only directs the government to “respect” the
rights enumerated in the Bill of Rights but also to “protect,
promote and fulfill” the rights.15 The Bill of Rights extends to
“all law” and regulates the government and “all organs of the
state.”16 The Bill of Rights also regulates “natural” and “juris13

Newstrom, supra note 6, at 786.
S. AFR. CONST., ch. 2, § 7(1), 1996 (emphasis added). The South African
Constitution took effect on February 4, 1997.
15
Id., ch. 2, § 7(2).
16
Id., ch. 2, § 8(1) (emphasis added).
14

R
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tic” persons in certain circumstances.17 Furthermore, the Bill
of Rights mandates that courts promote “the values that underlie an open and democratic society based on human dignity,
equality and freedom” and “the spirit, purport and objects of
the Bill of Rights.”18
Section 9 of Chapter 2 of the South African Constitution
establishes the right of equality. Section 9(1) boldly declares,
“Everyone is equal before the law and has the right to equal
protection and benefit of the law.”19 Section 9(3) further states,
“The state may not unfairly discriminate directly or indirectly
against anyone on one or more grounds, including race, gender, sex, pregnancy, marital status, ethnic or social origin, colour, sexual orientation, age, disability, religion, conscience,
belief, culture, language and birth.”20 Discrimination on the
basis of one of the grounds in Section 9(3) is presumptively
unconstitutional.21
The inclusion of sexual orientation in Section 9(3) of the
South African Constitution22 was the product of victory over an
oppressive and discriminatory apartheid regime.23 After
apartheid, South Africa began the process of transforming itself
into a “human rights state.”24 Indeed, upon signing the new
17
Id., ch. 2, § 8(2); see also id., ch. 2, §§ 8(2)–(3) (explaining when a court will
apply the Bill of Rights to regulate a natural or juristic person and what factors
the court will consider).
18
Id., ch. 2, §§ 39(1)–(2). The South African Constitution discusses the
“spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights” throughout its text. For example,
in Chapter 1, the Constitution notes that South Africa is founded on the values of
human dignity, equality, human rights, and freedom, among others. See id., ch.
1, § 1. The Preamble includes a similar discussion. See id. at pmbl.
19
Id., ch. 2, § 9(1) (emphasis added).
20
Id., ch. 2, § 9(3) (emphasis added).
21
See id., ch. 2, § 9(5) (“Discrimination on one or more of the grounds listed
in subsection (3) is unfair unless it is established that the discrimination is fair.”).
22
Hereinafter referred to as the “Equality Clause.”
23
See Eric C. Christiansen, Note, Ending the Apartheid of the Closet: Sexual
Orientation in the South African Constitutional Process, 32 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL.
997, 1010–18 (2000) [hereinafter Ending the Apartheid of the Closet] (explaining
the impact that the “realities of apartheid South Africa” had on the South African
Bill of Rights and the Equality Clause); see also Tom Lodge, The Interplay of NonViolent and Violent Action in the Movement Against Apartheid in South Africa,
1983–94, in CIVIL RESISTANCE & POWER POLITICS: THE EXPERIENCE OF NON-VIOLENT
ACTION FROM GANDHI TO THE PRESENT 213, 227 (Adam Roberts & Timothy Garton
Ash eds., 2009) (describing the influence of the progressive activists who participated in drafting the South African Constitution).
24
Makau wa Mutua, Hope and Despair for a New South Africa: The Limits of
Rights Discourse, 10 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 63, 65 (1997); see also Albie Sachs,
Constitutional Developments in South Africa, 28 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 695, 695
(1996) (“The goal [of the new Constitution] was to move from a racial autocracy to
a non-racial democracy, by means of a negotiated transition, the progressive
implementation of democracy, and respect for fundamental human rights.”).
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South African Constitution, Nelson Mandela declared, “By our
presence here today, we solemnly honour the pledge we made
to ourselves and to the world, that South Africa shall redeem
herself and thereby widen the frontiers of human freedom.”25
With the new South African Constitution, South Africa became
the first country to codify equal protection and freedom from
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation in its constitution.26 This is especially significant given the state of equality for LGBTQ+ individuals in the rest of the world,27 and in
contrast to other African countries.28
It is curious that South Africa became the first country in
which “[LGBTQ+ individuals] possessed a level of constitutional
25
Nelson Mandela, President of South Africa, Speech at the Signing of the
Constitution (Dec. 10, 1996), http://www.sahistory.org.za/archive/speech-president-nelson-mandela-signing-constitution-sharpeville-10-december-1996
[https://perma.cc/7JPW-CPVH].
26
See Eric C. Christiansen, Substantive Equality and Sexual Orientation:
Twenty Years of Gay and Lesbian Rights Adjudication Under the South African
Constitution, 49 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 565, 566–67 (2016) [hereinafter Substantive
Equality and Sexual Orientation] (“Among the exceptional elements of the South
African Equality Clause is its novel and progressive inclusion of anti-discrimination protections for lesbians and gay men. The prohibition of discrimination
based on sexual orientation is particularly important because it occurred—for the
first time in any national constitution . . . .”).
27
See James D. Wilets, Conceptualizing Private Violence Against Sexual Minorities as Gendered Violence: An International and Comparative Law Perspective,
60 ALB. L. REV. 989, 1028 (1997); see also Sebastian Maguire, The Human Rights
of Sexual Minorities in Africa, 35 CAL. W. INT’L L.J. 1, 4 (2004) (“In many jurisdictions throughout the world, sexual minorities are considered a criminal class.”);
AENGUS CARROLL & LUCAS RAMÓN MENDOS, INT’L LESBIAN, GAY, BISEXUAL, TRANS AND
INTERSEX ASS’N, STATE-SPONSORED HOMOPHOBIA: A WORLD SURVEY OF SEXUAL ORIENTATION LAWS 8 (12th ed. 2017), http://ilga.org/downloads/2017/ILGA_State_Spon
sored_Homophobia_2017_WEB.pdf [https://perma.cc/L96U-9L27] (“There are
72 States that we classify as criminalising States . . . .”).
28
See Maguire, supra note 27, at 4 n.10 (listing the African countries that
outlaw homosexuality); see also Kim Yi Dionne, Should We Call Africa
Homophobic?, WASH. POST (July 10, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
news/monkey-cage/wp/2015/07/10/why-im-not-calling-africa-homophobicanymore/?utm_term=.B02cd7d34693 [https://perma.cc/Q7K4-W9QP] (“Likewise, using survey data from 39 countries, the Pew Research Center reports
widespread rejection of homosexuality in Africa . . . .”); David Smith, Why Africa is
the Most Homophobic Continent, GUARDIAN (Feb. 22, 2014, 7:06 PM), https://
www.theguardian.com/world/2014/feb/23/africa-homophobia-uganda-antigay-law (“Western liberals eager to see the best in Africa must face an inconvenient truth: this is the most homophobic continent on Earth. Same-sex relations
are illegal in 36 of Africa’s 55 countries, according to Amnesty International, and
punishable by death in some states. Now a fresh crackdown is under way.”);
Jonathan Zimmerman, An African Epidemic of Homophobia, L.A. TIMES (June 29,
2013), http://articles.latimes.com/2013/jun/29/opinion/la-oe-zimmerman-africa-gays-20130630 [https://perma.cc/8YLL-NFNK] (“The South African examples speak loud and clear: Gay rights are human rights, not Western ones, so
everyone is enjoined to respect them. Too bad other African countries don’t.”).

R
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protection greater than that of any other nation—a level of legal
protection that remains pre-eminent twenty years later.”29
Professor Eric Christiansen notes that, despite South Africa’s
religiosity and conservatism, the combination of three factors
unique to South Africa in the 1990s ultimately led the drafters
to include progressive constitutional protections for LGBTQ+
individuals.30 The three factors include the (1) history and
timing, (2) ideology and non-racialism, and (3) constrained
drafting process.31
First, South African LGBTQ+ advocacy organizations
started to realize a level of legitimacy and political recognition
in the years preceding the “fundamental constitutional re-creation of a state that had existed for forty-seven years with discrimination as its primary political and social reality.”32 The
greater legitimacy of LGBTQ+ advocacy organizations and the
effort to include representation of various oppressed groups led
to the involvement of LGBTQ+ leaders in the anti-apartheid
movement.33 The LGBTQ+ rights movement was also gaining
momentum outside of South Africa’s borders. In the early
1990s, the European Court of Human Rights twice affirmed its
Dudgeon v. United Kingdom34 decision holding that Section 11
of the United Kingdom’s law criminalizing homosexual acts violated Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights.35
Similarly, the United Nations Human Rights Commission condemned the Australian state of Tasmania for criminalizing ho29

Substantive Equality and Sexual Orientation, supra note 26, at 585.
Id.
31
Id. at 585–87.
32
Id. at 587.
33
Id. at 586. Professor Christiansen also notes that “unrelated occurrences,”
including the outing of an anti-apartheid leader as well as homophobic remarks
uttered by a key African National Congress Party figure, also contributed to recognition and involvement of LGBTQ+ organizations in the anti-apartheid movement.
Id.; see also Derrick Fine & Julia Nicol, The Lavender Lobby: Working for Lesbian
and Gay Rights Within the Liberation Movement, in DEFIANT DESIRE: GAY AND LESBIAN LIVES IN SOUTH AFRICA 269, 269–70 (Mark Gevisser & Edwin Cameron eds.,
1995) (describing the unrelated occurrences and how the occurrences led to the
African National Congress Party recognizing the importance of equality for
LGBTQ+ South Africans).
34
45 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1981).
35
Substantive Equality and Sexual Orientation, supra note 26, at 586 (discussing Norris v. Ireland and Modinos v. Cyprus); see also Norris v. Ireland, 142
Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1988) (holding that Ireland’s law criminalizing homosexual
acts violated Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights); Modinos v.
Cyprus, 259 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1993) (holding that Cyprus’s law criminalizing
homosexual acts violated Article 8 of the European Convention on Human
Rights); see generally European Convention on Human Rights art. 8, Nov. 4,
1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 222 (establishing the right to respect for private life and
family).

R

30

R

\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\104-1\CRN101.txt

2018]

unknown

Seq: 9

WRONGFUL TERMI(GAY)TION

10-JAN-19

11:58

241

mosexual acts.36 And although the Canadian Supreme Court
upheld a law that excluded same-sex spouses from collecting
guaranteed income supplements, the Court held that Section
15 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms includes
sexual orientation as a protected ground.37 In sum, the fall of
apartheid and the process of drafting a new constitution transpired concurrently with the LGBTQ+ rights movement gaining
momentum both within and beyond South Africa’s borders.
Second, the principles of “non-racialism” and substantive
equality guided the African National Congress Party (ANC) and
the anti-apartheid movement more broadly.38 The principle of
non-racialism demands that the government both safeguard
human rights and immediately terminate any and all discrimination.39 Indeed, the ANC’s 1955 Freedom Charter declares,
“All Shall be Equal Before the Law!” and “All Shall Enjoy Equal
Human Rights!,” and generally expresses a commitment to
equality and anti-discrimination.40 This vision of a South Africa “founded on the principles of equality, multi-racial democracy, and human dignity” persevered from its initial
articulation in the 1955 Freedom Charter through the fall of
apartheid.41 Fortunately for the National Coalition for Gay and
Lesbian Equality (NCGLE) and other LGBTQ+ advocacy organizations, this vision favored both including the groups in the
process of drafting a new constitution and expressly codifying
LGBTQ+ rights in the new constitution.42 Additionally, the NCGLE and other LGBTQ+ advocacy organizations formed coalitions with the ANC and other anti-apartheid political
36
U.N. Human Rights Comm., Toonen v. Australia, Communication No. 488/
1992, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/50/D/488/1992 (1994); see also G.A. Res. 2200 (XXI),
annex, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (Dec. 19, 1966) [hereinafter ICCPR] (establishing the right to equal protection before the law without
discrimination).
37
See Egan v. Canada, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 513 (Can.) (holding that sexual orientation is a protected ground under Section 15 of the Canadian Charter of Rights
and Freedoms); see generally Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of
the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982, c. 11,
§ 15(1) (U.K.) (“Every individual is equal before and under the law and has the
right to the equal protection and equal benefit of the law without discrimination
and, in particular, without discrimination based on race, national or ethnic origin,
colour, religion, sex, age or mental or physical disability.”).
38
Substantive Equality and Sexual Orientation, supra note 26, at 586.
39
Id. at 587.
40
The Freedom Charter, SOUTH AFR. HIST. ONLINE, http://www.sahistory.org.
za/article/freedom-charter [https://perma.cc/DYH2-YVF2] (last updated Aug. 4,
2016).
41
Substantive Equality and Sexual Orientation, supra note 26, at 586.
42
Ending the Apartheid of the Closet, supra note 23, at 1037–38.
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organizations prior to the abolition of apartheid in South
Africa.43
Third, party-based delegates and other experts largely negotiated and drafted the new constitution behind closed
doors.44 Small thematic committees consisting only of a relatively small number of delegates and experts were responsible
for sequentially drafting and revising the text of each section of
the constitution.45 Additionally, the drafting process occurred
under “tight time constraints” and “strong political pressure”—
from both within and beyond South Africa’s borders.46 This
process resulted in a few influential party elites and experts
dictating a substantial portion of the new constitution’s text.47
Many of these drafters wholeheartedly espoused the principles
of “non-racialism” and substantive equality, and staunchly advocated for the inclusion of LGBTQ+ protections and rights in
the new constitution’s text.48 Moreover, the NCGLE and other
LGBTQ+ advocacy organizations leveraged their preexisting coalition with the ANC to ensure that the constitution included
protections on the basis of sexual orientation.49
Although the South African Constitution is a progressive
document that enshrines human dignity, equality, and freedom for LGBTQ+ South Africans, this Note recognizes that it is
not without shortcomings. Section 16 of Chapter 2 of the
South African Constitution establishes the right of freedom of
expression.50 Subsection 2 of Section 16 excepts certain acts
of expression from constitutional protection.51 The exceptions
include: war propaganda, incitement of imminent violence, and
hate speech based on protected grounds that incites harm.52
While the hate speech exception renders hate speech based on
race, ethnicity, gender, or religion unprotected expression, it
does not explicitly do so for sexual orientation.53
43
See Jacklyn Cock, Engendering Gay and Lesbian Rights: The Equality
Clause in the South African Constitution, 26 WOMEN’S STUD. INT’L F. 35, 36 (2003).
But this alliance caused significant disagreement within the ANC over LGBTQ+
rights both before and during the transition period. See also Fine & Nicol, supra
note 33, at 270–72.
44
Substantive Equality and Sexual Orientation, supra note 26, at 587.
45
Id.
46
Id.
47
Id.
48
Id.
49
See Newstrom, supra note 6, at 786.
50
S. AFR. CONST., ch. 2, § 16, 1996.
51
See id., ch. 2, § 16(2).
52
Id., ch. 2, § 16(2)(a)–(c).
53
Compare id., ch. 2, § 16(2)(c), with id., ch. 2, § 9(3).
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Section 37 similarly does not include sexual orientation as
a protected ground.54 Section 37 of Chapter 2 of the South
African Constitution establishes when a state of emergency
may be declared and the implications of such a declaration
concerning the rights established in Chapter 2.55 Subsection 5
of Section 37 states:
No Act of Parliament that authorises a declaration of a state
of emergency, and no legislation enacted or other action
taken in consequence of a declaration, may permit or
authorise—any derogation from a section mentioned in column 1 of the Table of Non-Derogable Rights, to the extent
indicated opposite that section in column 3 of the Table.56

According to the Table of Non-Derogable Rights, the right of
equality is protected from legislation related to a state of emergency declaration only “[w]ith respect to unfair discrimination
solely on the grounds of race, colour, ethnic or social origin,
sex, religion or language.”57 Thus, both Sections 16 and 37
demonstrate that the South African Constitution, which boldly
prohibits discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation, still
fails to provide the broadest protections for LGBTQ+ South
Africans. Nonetheless, the United States can look to the South
African Constitution as a model for enacting robust legal protections for LGBTQ+ citizens.
B. South African Constitutional Court Cases
After successfully advocating to include LGBTQ+ rights
and protections in the South African Constitution, the NCGLE
and other LGBTQ+ advocacy organizations immediately began
challenging discriminatory laws still in effect from the
apartheid era.58 In response to these challenges, the Constitutional Court, South Africa’s highest court, used the Equality
Clause to unanimously strike down countless discriminatory
laws.59 By using the Equality Clause to invalidate the discrimi54
Compare id., ch. 2, § 37(5)(c), Table of Non-Derogable Rights, with id., ch.
2, § 9(3).
55
Id., ch. 2, § 37.
56
Id., ch. 2, § 37(5)(c).
57
Id. Table of Non-Derogable Rights.
58
Substantive Equality and Sexual Orientation, supra note 26, at 588;
Maguire, supra note 27, at 11.
59
See, e.g., J v. Dir. Gen. 2003 (5) SA 621 (CC) at 15–16 para. 23 (S. Afr.)
(striking down a prohibition of registering both the non-biological and biological
homosexual parents on the birth certificate of a child born from artificial insemination); Du Toit v. Minister for Welfare and Population Dev. 2003 (2) SA 198 (CC) at
25 para. 25, 34–35 para. 44 (S. Afr.) (striking down sections of the Child Care Act
that unconstitutionally discriminated on the basis of sexual orientation in the

R
R

\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\104-1\CRN101.txt

244

unknown

Seq: 12

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

10-JAN-19

11:58

[Vol. 104:233

natory laws, the Constitutional Court unequivocally reaffirmed
equal protection under the law for LGBTQ+ South Africans.60
South African Equal Protection jurisprudence, unlike that in
the United States, mandates applying the same level of scrutiny and protection to each protected class recognized in the
Equality Clause.61 Another key difference between South African Equal Protection jurisprudence and American Equal Protection jurisprudence is the judicial system’s consideration of
“dignity.”62 The Constitutional Court has held that the equality
rights provided in Section 9 of the South African Constitution’s
Bill of Rights inextricably intertwine with the dignity rights

adoption context); Satchwell v. President of the Republic of S. Afr. 2002 (6) SA 1
(CC) at paras. 21, 37 (S. Afr.) (striking down sections of the Judge’s Remuneration
and Conditions of Employment Act 88 of 1989 that unconstitutionally discriminated on the basis of sexual orientation in the employment benefit context); Nat’l
Coal. for Gay & Lesbian Equal. v. Minister of Home Affairs 2000 (2) SA 1 (CC) at
para. 98 (S. Afr.) (striking down a section of the Aliens Control Act of 1991 that
unconstitutionally discriminated on the basis of sexual orientation in the immigration context); Nat’l Coal. for Gay & Lesbian Equal. v. Minister of Justice 1999 (1)
SA 6 (CC) at para. 106 (S. Afr.) (striking down sodomy laws that unconstitutionally targeted homosexuals in the criminal law context).
60
Substantive Equality and Sexual Orientation, supra note 26, at 588.
61
Compare Nat’l Coal. for Gay & Lesbian Equal. 1999 (1) SA 6 (CC) at para. 55
(S. Afr.) (“[Neither] our Constitution [n]or jurisprudence require us, in the way that
the United States Constitution requires of its Supreme Court, in the case of ‘. . .
rights not readily identifiable in the Constitution’s text,’ to ‘. . . identify the nature
of the rights qualifying for heightened judicial protection.’”), with Korematsu v.
United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944) (applying strict scrutiny to race-based
classifications), Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976) (applying intermediate
scrutiny to sex-based classifications), and Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 574
(2003) (applying rational basis scrutiny to sexual-orientation-based
classifications).
62
Compare Nat’l Coal. for Gay & Lesbian Equal. 1999 (1) SA 6 (CC) at para. 55
(S. Afr.) (“The 1996 Constitution contains express privacy and dignity guarantees
as well as an express prohibition of unfair discrimination on the ground of sexual
orientation, which the United States Constitution does not.” (footnote omitted)),
with Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2639 (2015) (Thomas, J., dissenting)
(“[T]he Constitution contains no ‘dignity’ Clause, and even if it did, the government would be incapable of bestowing dignity.”). Unlike in American jurisprudence, the right to dignity is widely recognized in international human rights
jurisprudence. See, e.g., Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217
(III) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, (Dec. 10, 1948) at pmbl. (“Whereas
recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all
members of the human family is the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in
the world . . . .”); ICCPR, supra note 36, at pmbl. (“[T]he inherent dignity and . . .
the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family is the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world . . . .”); G.A. Res. 2200 (XXI) A,
annex, International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, (Dec. 16,
1966) at pmbl. (“[T]he inherent dignity and . . . the equal and inalienable rights of
all members of the human family is the foundation of freedom, justice and peace
in the world . . . .”).
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provided in Section 10.63 Three landmark cases, which this
Note discusses below, demonstrate the South African government’s dedication to equal rights and equal protection under
the law for LGBTQ+ South Africans. The United States—
whether through legislation or judicial decisions—should follow South Africa’s example.
Although South African courts routinely invoke the South
African Constitution to enforce equal protection and equal dignity, problems still persist for many. While attitudes in South
Africa are improving, studies show overwhelming opposition to
homosexual conduct.64 The level of opposition to homosexuality in South Africa also far exceeds the level of opposition in
nations with similar legal protections.65 And LGBTQ+ individuals still face discrimination and violence from private actors.66
Indeed, in 2014, Minister of Justice Jeff Radebe noted, “Notwithstanding the comprehensive constitutional and legal
framework and protection for LGBT[Q+] persons, we have sadly
witnessed acts of discrimination and violent attacks being perpetrated against LGBT[Q+] persons.”67 The problems are amplified for LGBTQ+ individuals who are poor, Black, or
female.68 For example, the practice of “corrective rape,” which
is used primarily but not exclusively against Black lesbians,
entails sexually assaulting LGBTQ+ individuals to “cure” them
63
See, e.g., Nat’l Coal. for Gay & Lesbian Equal. 1999 (1) SA 6 (CC) at para. 28
(S. Afr.) (“[T]he common-law crime of sodomy [in addition to an infringement of the
right to equality] also constitutes an infringement of the right to dignity which is
enshrined in section 10 of our Constitution.”). Justice Sachs also underscored
the interrelation of the rights to equality and dignity. See id. at 150, 156–57
paras. 120, 125.
64
See TOM W. SMITH, NORC/U. CHI., GSS CROSS-NATIONAL REPORT NO. 31:
CROSS-NATIONAL DIFFERENCES IN ATTITUDES TOWARDS HOMOSEXUALITY 1, 17 (2011)
(explaining that a 2008 study found that about 84% of South Africans indicated
that same-sex sexual activity was “always wrong” while only about 8% of South
Africans indicated that it was “not wrong at all”); The Global Divide on Homosexuality: Greater Acceptance in More Secular and Affluent Countries, PEW RES. CTR.
(June 4, 2013), http://www.pewglobal.org/2013/06/04/the-global-divide-onhomosexuality/ [https://perma.cc/E2PL-UHE5] (explaining that a 2013 study
found that about 61% of South Africans indicated that “homosexuality should not
be accepted by society” while only 32% of South Africans indicated that homosexuality “should be accepted”).
65
See supra note 64.
66
See HUMAN RTS. WATCH & INT’L GAY & LESBIAN HUM. RTS. COMM’N, MORE THAN
A NAME: STATE-SPONSORED HOMOPHOBIA AND ITS CONSEQUENCES IN SOUTHERN AFRICA
179–230 (2003) [hereinafter HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH].
67
Programme Against LGBTI Violence Launched, NEWS24 (Apr. 29, 2014, 4:31
PM), https://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/Programme-against-LGBTIviolence-launched-20140429 [https://perma.cc/GP3J-Z5AL].
68
See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 66, at 187–96.
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of their homosexuality.69 This Note does not argue that the
fight for equality in South Africa is over. Rather, this Note
argues that South Africa is a model to which the United States
should look concerning employment non-discrimination laws
and workplace protections.
1. National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality v.
Minister of Justice
In National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality (NCGLE)
v. Minister of Justice, the Constitutional Court of South Africa
unanimously invalidated the common-law crime of sodomy
and struck down a section of the Sexual Offences Act.70 The
Court based its decision on the Bill of Rights of the South
African Constitution, including the rights to equality, dignity,
and privacy.71 One commentator describes the case as “the
most meaningful judicial victory for the gay rights movement
since the abolition of apartheid.”72
The Afrikaner ideology’s oppressive commitment to maintaining “morality” in South Africa produced a legal regime that
targeted and discriminated against LGBTQ+ South Africans.73
69
Lydia Smith, Corrective Rape: The Homophobic Fallout of Post-Apartheid
South Africa, TELEGRAPH (May 21, 2015, 7:00 AM), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/
women/womens-life/11608361/Corrective-rape-The-homophobic-fallout-ofpost-apartheid-South-Africa.html [https://perma.cc/Q8Z5-DFHF] (“South Africa
has one of the highest rates of rape in the world—including ‘corrective rape’—
used to ‘cure’ lesbian women of their homosexuality.”); see also Clare Carter, The
Brutality of ‘Corrective Rape,’ N.Y. TIMES (July 27. 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2013/07/26/opinion/26corrective-rape.html [https://
perma.cc/K7ZZ-A5PX] (“[I]t became evident to me that multiple layers of South
African society were responsible for the epidemic of corrective rape and that bias,
apathy and culpability ran deeper than I could have imagined: in educational and
religious institutions, the criminal justice system, and even within families.”); Lee
Middleton, ‘Corrective Rape’: Fighting a South African Scourge, TIME (Mar. 8,
2011), http://content.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,2057744,00.html
[https://perma.cc/8AB5-TS4W] (“Gays and lesbians are a particular target [of
homophobic sexual violence] in South Africa, as they are across Africa, where
traditional social conservatism is being distilled into an angry homophobia.”).
70
1999 (1) SA 6 (CC) at 131 para. 106 (S. Afr.). The Constitutional Court also
struck down discriminatory parts of the Criminal Procedures Act and the Security
Officers Act. Id. at 101–02 para. 74. The Criminal Procedure Act considered
sodomy as equivalent to murder, rape, and fraud. See Criminal Procedure Act 51
of 1977, Sched. 1 (S. Afr.).
71
Nat’l Coal. for Gay & Lesbian Equal. 1999 (1) SA 6 (CC) at paras. 27–31 (S.
Afr.); see also S. AFR. CONST., ch. 2, §§ 9, 10, 14, 1996 (recognizing the rights to
equality, dignity, and privacy).
72
Ryan Goodman, Beyond the Enforcement Principle: Sodomy Laws, Social
Norms, and Social Panoptics, 89 CALIF. L. REV. 643, 680 (2001).
73
Glen Retief, Keeping Sodom Out of the Laager: State Repression of Homosexuality in Apartheid South Africa, in DEFIANT DESIRE, supra note 33, at 99,
99–111. The Afrikaner ideology’s oppressive commitment to maintaining morality
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Indeed, South Africa did not recognize sodomy as a crime until
Dutch colonizers brought the Roman-Dutch common law to
South Africa in the seventeenth century.74 The common law of
sodomy criminalized a range of sexual activities and prohibited
any sexual act lacking the purpose of procreation.75 An individual convicted of sodomy was often sentenced to death.76
When the British gained control of South Africa from the
Dutch in 1806, the British preserved the common-law crime of
sodomy.77 The British went even further in the nineteenth century, enacting and enforcing criminal codes that criminalized
homosexual conduct between men.78 Furthermore, by the
twentieth century, the government continued to enforce the
common-law crime of sodomy and other “unnatural” sexualactivity prohibitions for homosexual conduct but not for heterosexual conduct.79
When the Afrikaner Reunited National Party gained control
of the South African House of Assembly from the British Union
Party in 1948, the Afrikaner Reunited National Party began
enacting a myriad of oppressive laws.80 The post-1948
apartheid laws included laws that codified the common-law
criminalization of sodomy and homosexual conduct between
men.81 For example, the Immorality Act of 1957 prohibited
certain conduct “relating to brothels and unlawful carnal intercourse and other acts in relation thereto,”82 which included
also motivated the apartheid policies aimed at preserving the moral purity of the
white nation. See Voris E. Johnson, Comment, Making Words on a Page Become
Everyday Life: A Strategy to Help Gay Men and Lesbians Achieve Full Equality
Under South Africa’s Constitution, 11 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 583, 591 (1997).
74
Heidi Joy Schmid, Decriminalization of Sodomy Under South Africa’s 1996
Constitution: Implications for South African and U.S. Law, 8 CARDOZO J. INT’L &
COMP. L. 163, 165 (2000); see generally Kevan Botha & Edwin Cameron, South
Africa, in SOCIOLEGAL CONTROL OF HOMOSEXUALITY: A MULTI-NATION COMPARISON 5,
5–9 (Donald J. West & Richard Green eds., 1997) (presenting a survey of sodomy
laws).
75
Pierre De Vos, On the Legal Construction of Gay and Lesbian Identity and
South Africa’s Transitional Constitution, 12 S. AFR. J. HUM. RTS. 265, 274 (1996).
76
Id. at 274–75. But sentencing individuals convicted of sodomy to death
became disfavored by 1886. See Botha & Cameron, supra note 74, at 11–12.
77
Johanna Bond, Gender and Non-Normative Sex in Sub-Saharan Africa, 23
MICH. J. GENDER & L. 65, 120 (2016).
78
See Schmid, supra note 74, at 165.
79
Johnson, supra note 73, at 592.
80
WILLEM DE KLERK, THE PURITANS IN AFRICA 215–20 (1983).
81
Johnson, supra note 73, at 592.
82
Sexual Offences Act 23 of 1957 (S. Afr.). The Immorality Act of 1988
renamed the Immorality Act of 1957 as the Sexual Offences Act of 1957. See
Johnson, supra note 73, at 593 n.40.
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acts such as interracial sex, prostitution, and cruising.83 Although the Immorality Act of 1957 did not explicitly criminalize
homosexual conduct between men, the government later did so
using the Act as the basis.84
Following a police raid in Forest Town, South Africa involving a party of homosexual men, the government amended the
Immorality Act of 1957 to include Section 20A.85 The amended
section imposed punishment on “[any] male person who commits with another male person at a party any act which is
calculated to stimulate sexual passion or to give sexual gratification . . . .”86 The amendment also raised the age of consent
for homosexual men to nineteen, while maintaining the age of
consent for everyone else at sixteen.87
In 1997, the NCGLE and the South African Human Rights
Commission filed a constitutional challenge to sodomy laws in
the High Court.88 The challengers contended that the sodomy
laws targeted only men and homosexual conduct between
men.89 This targeting, the challengers argued, violated the
Equality Clause of the South African Constitution by unfairly
discriminating based on gender and sexual orientation.90 The
High Court agreed.91
On appeal, the Constitutional Court unanimously affirmed
the High Court’s decision and struck down the challenged sodomy laws.92 Justice Ackermann, addressing the principal issue of whether the sodomy laws violated the right of equality,
83
Schmid, supra note 74, at 166. Some commentators define “cruising” as a
term to describe the act of men looking for casual sex. See Jordan Blair Woods,
Don’t Tap, Don’t Stare, and Keep Your Hands to Yourself! Critiquing the Legality of
Gay Sting Operations, 12 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 545, 545 n.3 (2009).
84
Johnson, supra note 73, at 593.
85
See Schmid, supra note 74, at 166; Immorality Amendment Act 57 of 1969
(S. Afr.). For a more comprehensive discussion of the police raid and the Immorality Amendment Act, see Johnson, supra note 73, at 593–95.
86
Immorality Amendment Act 57 of 1969, § 3 (S. Afr.). Section 3 of the 1969
Act inserted Section 20A into the 1957 Act.
87
See id. at § 1. Section 1 of the 1969 Act altered Section 14 of the 1957 Act.
The age of consent for homosexual women was raised to nineteen in 1988. See
Immorality Amendment Act 2 of 1988, § 5 (S. Afr.). Section 5 of the 1988 Act
altered Section 14 of the 1957 Act.
88
Nat’l Coal. for Gay & Lesbian Equal. v. Minister of Justice 1998 (6) BCLR
726 (W) at para. 2 (S. Afr.).
89
Id.
90
Id.
91
Id.; see also Cathi Albertyn & Beth Goldblatt, The Decriminalization of Gay
Sexual Offences: The National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality v The Minister of Justice and Others, 1998 (6) BCLR 726 (W), 14 S. AFR. J. ON HUM. RTS. 461,
461–68 (1998) (describing Judge Heher’s decision in Nat’l Coal. for Gay & Lesbian
Equal. 1998 (6) BCLR 726 (W)).
92
Nat’l Coal. for Gay & Lesbian Equal. 1999 (1) SA 6 (CC) at para. 30 (S. Afr.).
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applied a three-step discrimination analysis.93 The analysis
asks whether: (1) the action discriminates based on a particular ground, (2) the discrimination is unfair, and (3) the unfair
discrimination is justified.94
Concerning the first inquiry of the analysis, the Court concluded that the challenged sodomy laws targeted men and specifically homosexual conduct between men.95 Thus, the
challenged sodomy laws discriminated on the basis of gender
and sexual orientation.96 Addressing the second inquiry, the
Court noted that discrimination based on a ground stated in
the Equality Clause is presumptively unfair.97 In the alternative, the Court considered several factors to determine whether
the discrimination was unfair.98 Justice Ackermann
elaborated:
In order to determine whether the discriminatory provision
has impacted on complainants unfairly, various factors must
be considered. These would include: (a) the position of the
complainants in society and whether they have suffered in
the past from patterns of disadvantage . . . ; (b) the nature of
the provision or power and the purpose sought to be achieved
by it . . . ; (c) with due regard to (a) and (b) above, and any
other relevant factors, the extent to which the discrimination
has affected the rights or interests of complainants and
whether it has led to an impairment of their fundamental
human dignity or constitutes an impairment of a comparably
serious nature.99

The Court concluded that: (a) homosexual men are a “permanent minority in society” and have been disadvantaged; (b) the
nature of the sodomy laws is to criminalize “private conduct of
consenting adults which causes no harm to anyone else”; and
(c) the discrimination has “gravely affected” the rights and
“deeply impaired” the fundamental dignity of homosexual
93
See id. at paras. 15–19 (describing the discrimination analysis and citing
Harksen v. Lane 1998 (1) SA 300 (CC) at para. 53 (S. Afr.)). The discrimination
analysis which Justice Ackermann applied has since become the “standard analysis for all discrimination questions.” Substantive Equality and Sexual Orientation,
supra note 26, at 589.
94
Nat’l Coal. for Gay & Lesbian Equal. 1999 (1) SA 6 (CC) at paras. 16–17 (S.
Afr.).
95
Id. at paras. 11–13, 26.
96
Id.
97
Id. at paras. 17–18.
98
Id. at para. 19.
99
Id. (citing Harksen v. Lane NO 1998 (1) SA 300 (CC) at paras. 50–51 (S.
Afr.)).
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men.100 Thus, the challenged sodomy laws discriminated unfairly.101 Finally, concerning the third inquiry, the Court
stated that the unfair discrimination may be justified only if it
satisfied the Limitations Clause of the Constitution.102 The
Court ultimately held, however, that “there is nothing which
can be placed in the other balance of the scale” and that “[t]he
inevitable conclusion is that the discrimination in question is
unfair. . . .”103 Thus, the challenged sodomy laws violated Section 9 of Chapter 2 of the South African Constitution.104
In its analysis of whether the challenged sodomy laws violated the rights of dignity and privacy, the Court considered
court cases from other countries dealing with sodomy laws.105
The Court recognized a trend in which Western democracies
began decriminalizing sodomy and adopting more liberal legal
attitudes toward LGBTQ+ individuals.106 The Court also noted
that the United States was an exception to the trend.107 Justice Ackermann and the Court aptly noted that Bowers v. Hardwick was decided by a narrow majority of the United States
Supreme Court,108 the case was the “subject of sustained criticism,”109 and the case was largely inconsistent with the more
100
Nat’l Coal. for Gay & Lesbian Equal. 1999 (1) SA 6 (CC) at paras. 23–26 (S.
Afr.) (citing Edwin Cameron, Sexual Orientation and the Constitution: A Test Case
for Human Rights, 110 S. AFR. L.J. 450, 452–58 (1993)).
101
Nat’l Coal. for Gay & Lesbian Equal. 1999 (1) SA 6 (CC) at para. 26 (S. Afr.).
102
Id. at para. 17; see also S. AFR. CONST., ch. 2, § 36(1), 1996 (“The rights in
the Bill of Rights may be limited only in terms of law of general application to the
extent that the limitation is reasonable and justifiable in an open and democratic
society based on human dignity, equality[,] and freedom, taking into account all
relevant factors . . . .”).
103
Nat’l Coal. for Gay & Lesbian Equal. 1999 (1) SA 6 (CC) at para. 27 (S. Afr.).
104
Id.
105
See id. at paras. 40–57; see also supra notes 34–37 and accompanying text
(discussing Dudgeon, Norris, Toonen, and Egan).
106
Nat’l Coal. for Gay & Lesbian Equal. 1999 (1) SA 6 (CC) at para. 52 (S. Afr.).
107
Id. at para. 53; see also Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 196 (1986)
(upholding the sodomy laws of Georgia and numerous other states).
108
Nat’l Coal. for Gay & Lesbian Equal. 1999 (1) SA 6 (CC) at para. 53 (S. Afr.).
Bowers was decided by a 5–4 majority of the United States Supreme Court. See
Bowers, 478 U.S. at 186. The Court later overturned Bowers in Lawrence v.
Texas. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003).
109
Nat’l Coal. v. Gay & Lesbian Equal. 1999 (1) SA 6 (CC) at para. 54 (S. Afr.);
see also Thomas C. Grey, Bowers v. Hardwick Diminished, 68 U. COLO. L. REV.
373, 385–86 (1997) (“As a result, [Bowers] remains formally on the books, ‘still
good law’ only in the sense that it is available to be cited as binding precedent in a
lower court against anyone who actually attempts a direct privacy attack on a
sodomy statute. But outside that specific and increasingly peripheral context, it
appears that its rational basis holding has, without much ceremony, been
ushered off the constitutional stage.”).
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recent case of Romer v. Evans.110 In addition to disregarding
Bowers for those reasons, the Court also observed that the
South African Constitution is far more progressive in its protections for its LGBTQ+ citizens than the U.S. Constitution.111
Even though the United States Supreme Court eventually
struck down sodomy laws, the South African Constitutional
Court did so nearly a decade earlier. The NCGLE Sodomy Constitutional Court case demonstrates South Africa’s commitment
to equal protection for its LGBTQ+ citizens—a model to which
the United States can and should look. The same is true for the
Satchwell and Fourie cases, which this Note discusses below.
2. Satchwell v. President of the Republic of South Africa
In Satchwell v. President of the Republic of South Africa, the
Constitutional Court of South Africa unanimously invalidated
sections of the Judges’ Remuneration and Conditions of Employment Act of 1989.112 The Court held that denying samesex spouses of judges the same employment benefits that the
government affords to opposite-sex spouses of judges violated
the Bill of Rights of the South African Constitution.113
Similar to the Sexual Offences Act and the other sodomy
laws of the oppressive apartheid regime, the Judges’ Remuneration and Conditions of Employment Act targeted and discriminated against LGBTQ+ South Africans.114 The Act stipulated
that the surviving spouse of a deceased judge would receive a
portion of the judge’s salary.115 In 2001, Kathy Satchwell, an
openly lesbian judge, and her partner, Lesley Louise Carnelley,
filed a constitutional challenge to the Act in the High Court.116
Although Satchwell and Carnelley were not legally married,
they had been in an “intimate, committed, exclusive, and permanent relationship since about 1986” and “live[d] in every
110
Nat’l Coal. for Gay & Lesbian Equal. 1999 (1) SA 6 (CC) at para. 54 (S. Afr.);
see also Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 635–36 (1996) (invalidating an amendment to the Colorado constitution that prohibited local ordinances protecting
individuals based on sexual orientation).
111
Nat’l Coal. for Gay & Lesbian Equal. 1999 (1) SA 6 (CC) at para. 55 (S. Afr.);
see also supra notes 61–62 and accompanying text (comparing South African and
American jurisprudence concerning equal protection and dignity).
112
2002 (6) SA 1 (CC) at paras. 21, 37 (S. Afr.); see also Judges’ Remuneration
and Conditions of Employment Act 88 of 1989 (S. Afr.).
113
Satchwell 2002 (6) SA 1 (CC) at paras. 23, 37 (S. Afr.).
114
See Judges’ Remuneration and Conditions of Employment Act, supra note
112.
115
Id.
116
See Satchwell v. President of the Republic of South Africa 2001 (12) BCLR
1284 (T) (S. Afr.).
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respect as a married couple . . . .”117 They argued that the
Judges’ Remuneration and Conditions of Employment Act provided benefits to the spouses of heterosexual judges, but withheld benefits from the partners of homosexual judges.118 This
unequal treatment, Satchwell and Carnelley contended, violated the Equality Clause of the South African Constitution by
unfairly discriminating based on sexual orientation.119 The
High Court agreed, holding that the word “spouse” be read
as “spouse or partner, in a permanent same-sex life
partnership.”120
On appeal, the Constitutional Court unanimously affirmed
in large part the High Court’s decision and held that denying
equal benefits to homosexual partners is unconstitutional.121
The Court noted that it recognized various forms of legal partnerships in a previous case.122 Additionally, the Court pointed
to woman-to-woman marriages in traditional African societies.123 The Court next applied the three-step discrimination
analysis applied in the Harksen and NCGLE Sodomy Constitutional Court cases.124 The Court concluded that the Judges’
Remuneration and Conditions of Employment Act discriminated based on sexual orientation.125 Thus, the Court presumed the discrimination to be unfair and unconstitutional.126
Finally, the Constitutional Court held that the word “spouse”
instead be read as “spouse or partner, in a permanent samesex life partnership in which the partners have undertaken reciprocal duties of support.”127

117
Satchwell 2002 (6) SA 1 (CC) at para. 4 (S. Afr.). See id. at para. 5 for
further “evidence of their emotional and financial inter-dependence.”
118
Id. at para. 3.
119
Id. at para. 14.
120
Id. at para. 1.
121
Id. at para. 26.
122
Id. at para. 12 (citing Nat’l Coal. for Gay and Lesbian Equal. v. Minister of
Home Affairs 2000 (2) SA 1 (CC) at para. 36 (S. Afr.)).
123
Satchwell 2002 (6) SA 1 (CC) at para. 12 (S. Afr.); see generally C.O.
Akpamgbo, A “Woman to Woman” Marriage and the Repugnancy Clause: A Case of
Putting New Wine into Old Bottles, 14 AFR. L. STUD. 87, 92 (1977) (“If the local law
recognises a ‘woman to woman’ marriage, and the incidents of such status are
sought to be enforced, it is not the place of the law to invoke the repugnancy test
to exclude the application of such customary rules.”).
124
Satchwell 2002 (6) SA 1 (CC) at paras. 20–21 (S. Afr.); see also supra note
93 and accompanying text.
125
Satchwell 2002 (6) SA 1 (CC) at para. 21 (S. Afr.).
126
Id. at para. 23; see also S. AFR. CONST., ch. 2, § 9(5), 1996.
127
Satchwell 2002 (6) SA 1 (CC) at paras. 34, 37 (S. Afr.) (emphasis added).
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3. Minister of Home Affairs v. Fourie
In Minister of Home Affairs v. Fourie, the Constitutional
Court of South Africa unanimously invalidated the commonlaw definition of marriage and struck down a section of the
Marriage Act.128 The Court held that denying same-sex
couples the same status and benefits of marriage that the government affords to opposite-sex couples violated the Bill of
Rights of the South African Constitution.129
The Marriage Act governs the formation of marriages and
the procedures of marriage ceremonies.130 Although the Act
does not specifically stipulate that a marriage is only between
one man and one woman, some courts interpreted the Act to
mean exactly that.131 Additionally, according to the South African common law, which developed from Roman-Dutch law,
marriage is the “union of one man with one woman, to the
exclusion . . . of all others.”132 In 2002, Marie Fourie and her
partner, Cecelia Bonthuys, filed a constitutional challenge in
the High Court to the limitation of marriage to one man and one
woman.133 Fourie and Bonthuys had been in a relationship for
more than ten years and wished to get married and obtain legal
recognition as spouses.134 They argued that excluding homosexual couples from civil marriages and legal recognition as
spouses violated the Equality Clause of the South African Constitution by unfairly discriminating based on sexual orientation.135 The High Court disagreed and refused to invalidate the
exclusion of homosexual couples from marriage.136
On appeal, the Supreme Court of Appeal reversed the High
Court’s decision.137 The Supreme Court unanimously found
that excluding homosexual couples from marriage unfairly discriminated based on sexual orientation and the majority opinion interpreted the common-law definition of marriage to
include homosexual couples.138 The majority opinion, how128
2006 (1) SA 524 (CC) at paras. 118, 120 (S. Afr.); see also Marriage Act 25
of 1961 (S. Afr.).
129
Fourie 2006 (1) SA 524 (CC) at paras. 78–79, 114 (S. Afr.).
130
Marriage Act, supra note 128; Fourie 2006 (1) SA 524 (CC) at para. 3.
131
Fourie 2006 (1) SA 524 (CC) at para. 7 (S. Afr.) (discussing the decision of
the High Court).
132
Id. at paras. 3–4 (S. Afr.) (citing Mashia Ebrahim v. Mahomed Essop 1905
TS 59, 61 (S. Afr.)).
133
Minister of Home Affairs v. Fourie (2002) ZAGPHC 1 (S. Afr.).
134
Fourie 2006 (1) SA 524 (CC) at para. 1 (S. Afr.).
135
Id. at paras. 2–3.
136
Id. at para. 7.
137
Id. at para. 12.
138
Id. at paras. 12, 22.
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ever, did not render judgment on the Marriage Act.139 The
minority opinion, on the other hand, would have interpreted
the Marriage Act to include homosexual couples.140
Justice Albie Sachs, writing for a unanimous Constitutional Court, first reviewed the prior Constitutional Court cases
dealing with unfair discrimination based on sexual orientation.141 According to the Court, those cases proclaimed that
equality, dignity, freedom, and human rights form the foundation of South African society and its legal system.142 The Court
elaborated:
[W]hat is at stake is not simply a question of removing an
injustice experienced by a particular section of the community. At issue is a need to affirm the very character of our
society as one based on tolerance and mutual respect. The
test of tolerance is not how one finds space for people with
whom, and practice with which, one feels comfortable, but
how one accommodates the expression of what is
discomfiting.143

The Court then discussed the importance of marriage and concluded that exclusion of homosexual couples from marriage
constitutes unfair discrimination.144 Thus, the Court held that
both the common-law definition of marriage and Section 30(1)
of the Marriage Act violate Section 9 of the Bill of Rights.145 The
Court, however, deferred implementation of its ruling for one
year in order to provide Parliament the opportunity to correct
the violation.146 Justice O’Regan, while disagreeing with “very
little in the comprehensive and careful judgment of [Justice]
Sachs,” dissented on the choice of remedy.147 The proper remedy, Justice O’Regan opined, is a decision by the Constitutional
Court reading-in language to Section 30(1) of the Marriage Act
that comports with the provisions of Section 9 of the Bill of
Rights.148
In 2006, Parliament passed the Civil Unions Act, which
legalized marriage equality in South Africa.149 With the Civil
139

Id. at paras. 21–22.
Id. at paras. 30–31.
141
See id. at paras. 49–59; see also supra note 59 and accompanying text.
142
Fourie 2006 (1) SA 524 (CC) at para. 60 (S. Afr.).
143
Id.
144
Id. at paras. 64, 71, 78.
145
Id. at para. 78.
146
Id. at para. 162.
147
Id. at para. 165 (O’Regan, J., dissenting).
148
Id. at para. 169 (O’Regan, J., dissenting).
149
Substantive Equality and Sexual Orientation, supra note 26, at 596; see
also Civil Union Act 17 of 1996 (S. Afr.).
140
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Unions Act, South Africa became the fifth country in the world
to legalize marriage equality.150 The United States would not
legalize marriage equality for nearly another decade.151 Fourie
is simply another example demonstrating that South Africa
should serve as a model for the United States in the realm of
equal protection for LGBTQ+ individuals. Although the United
States has since legalized marriage equality,152 “justice too long
delayed is justice denied.”153 The same is true in the employment discrimination context.
C. South African Non-Discrimination Laws
1. The Employment Equity Act
In 1998, the South African Parliament enacted the Employment Equity Act (EEA) pursuant to the mandate set forth
in Section 9(4) of the Bill of Rights.154 The EEA specifically
forbids discrimination in the employment context and seeks to
correct the disparities, disadvantages, and discrimination
caused by apartheid.155 The purpose of the EEA is to attain
employment equity by “promoting equal opportunity and fair
treatment in employment through the elimination of unfair discrimination” and “implementing affirmative[-]action measures
to redress the disadvantages in employment experienced by
designated groups.”156 To fulfill this purpose, the EEA requires
that every employer update their employment policies and
practices to eliminate any unfair discrimination on the enumerated protected grounds.157 The EEA includes both gender
and sexual orientation as protected grounds on the basis of
150
Gay Marriage Around the World, PEW RES. CTR. (Aug. 8, 2017), http://
www.pewforum.org/2017/08/08/gay-marriage-around-the-world-2013/
[https://perma.cc/LEL2-7XGD] (listing the countries that have legalized marriage equality).
151
See supra Introduction.
152
See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2607–08 (2015).
153
Martin Luther King Jr., The Negro Is Your Brother, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Aug.
1963, at 78, reprinted in Martin Luther King Jr., Letter from Birmingham Jail,
ATLANTIC (Feb. 2018), https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2018/02/
letter-from-birmingham-jail/552461/ [https://perma.cc/K8KG-43ZF] (emphasis
added) (“For years now I have heard the word ‘wait.’ It rings in the ear of every
Negro with piercing familiarity. This ‘wait’ has almost always meant ‘never.’ . . .
We must come to see, with the distinguished jurist of yesterday, that ‘justice too
long delayed is justice denied.’”).
154
Employment Equity Act 55 of 1998 (S. Afr.); see also S. AFR. CONST., ch. 2,
§ 9(4), 1996 (“No person may unfairly discriminate directly or indirectly against
anyone on one or more grounds in terms of subsection (3). National legislation
must be enacted to prevent or prohibit unfair discrimination.”).
155
Employment Equity Act 55 of 1998 pmbl. (S. Afr.).
156
Id. § 2.
157
Id. § 5.
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which employers may not unfairly discriminate.158 The prohibition of unfair discrimination also extends to harassment in
the workplace based on a protected ground.159
Not only does the EEA prohibit unfair discrimination but it
also mandates that certain employers implement affirmativeaction measures.160 The EEA defines affirmative-action measures as “measures designed to ensure that suitably qualified
people from designated groups have equal-employment opportunities and are equitably represented in all occupational categories and levels in the workforce of a designated employer.”161
To implement affirmative-action measures, the EEA provides
that certain employers must consult with its employees, conduct an analysis, prepare an employment equity plan, and report on its progress to the Director-General.162 Finally, to help
advise the Minister of Labour and monitor and enforce the
provisions of the EEA, the Act establishes a Commission for
Employment Equity.163
2. The Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair
Discrimination Act
Like the EEA, Parliament passed the Promotion of Equality
and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act (PEPUDA) pursuant to Section 9(4) of the Bill of Rights.164 The PEPUDA seeks
to eliminate “deeply embedded” “social and economic inequalities” and unfair discrimination remaining from “colonialism,
apartheid and patriarchy.”165 To achieve its end, the PEPUDA
prohibits unfair discrimination, harassment, and hate speech
based on the enumerated protected grounds.166 Like Section 9
of the Bill of Rights, the PEPUDA includes gender and sexual
orientation as protected grounds.167 Although the PEPUDA
specifically highlights race, gender, and disability throughout
its text, the Act does not differentiate between the enumerated
158

Id. § 6(1).
Id. § 6(3).
160
Id. § 13(1).
161
Id. § 15(1).
162
Id. § 13(2); see also id. §§ 16, 19–21 (further elaborating on the steps enumerated in § 13(2)).
163
Id. ch. 4.
164
Saras Jagwanth, Affirmative Action in a Transformative Context: The South
African Experience, 36 CONN. L. REV. 725, 730 (2004)
165
Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act 4 of
2000 pmbl. (S. Afr.).
166
Id. ch. 2.
167
Id. ch. 1.
159
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protected grounds.168 Finally, the PEPUDA establishes special
Equality Courts to address discrimination by private parties.169
The PEPUDA and EEA are more than mere non-discrimination laws; they both impose a duty to promote equality on
state and non-state actors.170 The acts are not only reactive
but also proactive.171 Some commentators note that legislation
like the PEPUDA and EEA recognize that discrimination and
inequality are systemic and structural.172 Although the first
step for the United States is to implement federal employment
non-discrimination laws and robust workplace protections for
LGBTQ+ individuals,173 the ultimate goal should be to implement legislation like the PEPUDA and EEA. States that have
already enacted robust workplace protections for LGBTQ+ individuals should begin to “experiment” with legislation modeled
after the PEPUDA and EEA.174
II
THE CURRENT STATE OF NON-DISCRIMINATION LAW AND
JURISPRUDENCE IN THE UNITED STATES AND THE POST-OBERGEFELL
LGBTQ+ RIGHTS MOVEMENT
In the aftermath of Windsor,175 Hollingsworth,176 and
Obergefell177—the recent landmark marriage equality cases—
the focus of the LGBTQ+ rights movement in the United States
has shifted from marriage equality to employment and housing
discrimination.178 Chad Griffin, President of the Human
168
Jagwanth, supra note 164, at 741; see also Promotion of Equality and
Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act, supra note 165, §§ 7–9.
169
Id. at ch. 4.
170
Jagwanth, supra note 164, at 741.
171
Id.
172
See SANDRA FREDMAN, DISCRIMINATION LAW 122 (2002) (“The duty [to promote
equality] becomes that, not just of compensating identified victims, but of restructuring institutions. Correspondingly, the duty-bearer is identified as the body in
the best position to perform this duty.”).
173
See infra Part IV.
174
See infra note 181 and accompanying text.
175
United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744 (2013) (invalidating the Defense of
Marriage Act for denying equal treatment to same-sex marriages).
176
Hollingsworth v. Perry, 570 U.S. 693 (2013) (affirming the California Supreme Court’s decision to invalidate Proposition 8’s definition of marriage as a
union between a heterosexual couple).
177
Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015) (invalidating state bans of
same-sex marriage).
178
This is not to say that problems concerning the realization of the right to
marriage equality did not persist after Obergefell. See, e.g., Barber v. Bryant, 860
F.3d 345, 350–51 (5th Cir. 2017) (considering Mississippi’s version of the First
Amendment Defense Act (HB 1523), which Mississippi passed in response to
Obergefell); Miller v. Davis, 123 F. Supp. 3d 924, 930–32 (E.D. Ky. 2015) (consid-

R
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Rights Campaign, notably said, “Even after this 50 state marriage victory at the Supreme Court, in most states in this country, a couple who gets married at 10 a.m. remain[s] at risk of
being fired from their jobs by noon and evicted from their home
by 2 p.m. simply for posting their wedding photos on
Facebook.”179
A. State Employment Non-Discrimination Protections
FIGURE 1180
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Current U.S. LGBT[Q+] employment discrimination laws.
Sexual orientation and gender identity: all employment
Sexual orientation: all employment, gender identity only in state employment
Sexual orientation: all employment
Sexual orientation and gender identity: state employment only
Sexual orientation: state employment only
No state-level protection for LGBT[Q+] employees

ering a county clerk’s refusal to grant marriage licenses to same-sex couples after
Obergefell); Searcy v. Strange, 81 F. Supp. 3d 1285, 1286–87 (S.D. Ala. 2015)
(considering Alabama’s refusal to comply with federal court orders to begin samesex marriages after Obergefell); cf. Ira C. Lupu, Moving Targets: Obergefell, Hobby
Lobby, and the future of LGBT Rights, 7 ALA. C.R. & C.L. L. REV. 1, 4 (2015) (“I will
appraise the legal and political salience of Hobby Lobby, and religious freedom
concerns more generally, with respect to the development of LGBT anti-discrimination law.”).
179
Historic Marriage Equality Ruling Generates Momentum for New Non-Discrimination Law, HUMAN RTS. CAMPAIGN (July 7, 2015), https://www.hrc.org/blog/
historic-marriage-equality-ruling-generates-momentum-for-new-non-discrimina
[https://perma.cc/CW7V-3Q8U].
180
LGBT Employment Discrimination in the United States, WIKIPEDIA (last edited
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Currently in the United States, over half of the states and
territories have employment non-discrimination statutes that
protect both on the basis of sexual orientation and gender identity in both the public and private sector.181 Two states have
employment non-discrimination statutes that protect only on
the basis of sexual orientation in both the public and private
sector.182 Several states have an executive order, administrative order, or a similar action prohibiting discrimination on the
basis of sexual orientation and gender identity in only the public sector.183 Finally, a few states have an executive order,
administrative order, or a similar action prohibiting discrimination only on the basis of sexual orientation and only in the
public sector.184 The remaining seventeen states have no employment non-discrimination protections for LGBTQ+
Americans.185
Feb. 1, 2018, 6:28 AM), https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/LGBT_employment_
discrimination_in_the_United_States [https://perma.cc/RQ4J-5KP9].
181
For a comprehensive discussion of the states and territories, see Know
Your Rights: Transgender People and the Law, ACLU [hereinafter Know Your
Rights], https://www.aclu.org/know-your-rights/transgender-people-and-law
[https://perma.cc/G952-9SY4]; JEROME HUNT, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS ACTION
FUND, A STATE-BY-STATE EXAMINATION OF NONDISCRIMINATION LAWS AND POLICIES
(2012), https://www.americanprogress.org/wp-content/uploads/issues/2012/
06/pdf/state_nondiscrimination.pdf [https://perma.cc/KY42-YMF5].
182
These states include New Hampshire and Wisconsin. See HUNT, supra note
181. In March 2018, however, the New Hampshire House of Representatives
passed HB 1319, which prohibits discrimination based on gender identity in
employment, housing, and places of public accommodation. See Dominique Mosbergen, New Hampshire House Votes to Protect Transgender People from Discrimination, HUFFINGTON POST (Mar. 8, 2018, 3:04 AM), https://www.huffingtonpost
.com/entry/new-hampshire-transgender-anti-discrimination-bill_us_5aa0c62de
4b0d4f5b66d5a88 [https://perma.cc/TQL5-YBF9].
183
See sources cited supra note 181; see also Mosbergen, supra note 182
(discussing the New Hampshire House of Representatives’s approval of a new
transgender non-discrimination law).
184
See HUNT, supra note 181.
185
Some cities and localities in these states, however, have passed local nondiscrimination ordinances. See, e.g., Lauren McGaughy, Shreveport Becomes Second City in Louisiana After New Orleans to Pass Non-Discrimination Ordinance,
TIMES-PICAYUNE (Dec. 10, 2013), http://www.nola.com/politics/index.ssf/2013/
12/fairness_ordinance_shreveport_lgbt_gay_la.html [https://perma.cc/SJ4V2TMC]. Similarly, cities and localities in states that do not prohibit protections on
the basis of either gender identity or sexual orientation have passed local nondiscrimination ordinances. See, e.g., Dustin Gardiner & Amy B. Wang, Phoenix
City Council Votes to Amend Discrimination Law, AZ CENTRAL (Feb. 28, 2013, 9:38
AM), http://archive.azcentral.com/community/phoenix/articles/20130226phoe
nix-discrimination-law-amend.html [https://perma.cc/XPM9-D5UV]; Eric M.
Johnson, Anchorage Lawmakers Pass LGBT Anti-Discrimination Law, REUTERS
(Sept. 30, 2015, 4:10 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-alaska-lgbt/
anchorage-lawmakers-pass-lgbt-anti-discrimination-law-idUSKCN0RU2MX2015
0930 [https://perma.cc/8ALJ-7CUF]; Sanjay Talwani, Nondiscrimination Ordinance Passes Unanimously in Helena, BILLINGS GAZETTE (Dec. 18, 2012), http://
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B. Federal Employment Non-Discrimination Protections
Although LGBTQ+ advocacy organizations and their allies
have put ample resources into pushing federal legislation that
provides protections for LGBTQ+ citizens, they have very little
to show for their efforts.186 The only federal law that expressly
prohibits discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation or
gender identity is the Violence Against Women Act.187 Two
other significant pieces of federal legislation that protect
LGBTQ+ citizens are the Hate Crimes Prevention Act and the
Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell Repeal Act.188 When Congress repealed
Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell, however, only lesbian, gay, and bisexual
service members enjoyed the “significant victory.”189 The law
still barred transgender service members from serving in the
armed forces openly.190 Given the lack of support in Congress
billingsgazette.com/news/state-and-regional/montana/nondiscrimination-ordi
nance-passes-unanimously-in-helena/article_1ea97782-b180-57fb-9e41-08ebf8
b462b6.html [https://perma.cc/5ELN-ED5Y].
186
See Lisa Bornstein & Megan Bench, Married on Sunday, Fired on Monday:
Approaches to Federal LGBT Civil Rights Protections, 22 WM. & MARY J. OF WOMEN
& L. 31, 46 (2015); Lupu, supra note 178, at 12.
187
Violence Against Women Act, 42 U.S.C. § 13925(b)(13) (2012) (current version at 34 U.S.C. § 12291(b)(13) (2018)) (“No person in the United States shall, on
the basis of actual or perceived race, color, religion, national origin, sex, gender
identity, . . . sexual orientation, or disability, be excluded from participation in, be
denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or
activity funded in whole or in part with funds made available under the Violence
Against Women Act . . . .”); Lupu, supra note 178, at 12.
188
See Bornstein & Bench, supra note 186, at 46; Matthew Shepard and
James Byrd, Jr., Hate Crimes Prevention Act, Pub. L. No. 111-84, 123 Stat. 2835,
2839 (2009) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 249(a)(2) (2012)) (adding sexual orientation
and gender identity as protected classes under the federal hate crime law); Don’t
Ask, Don’t Tell Repeal Act, Pub. L. No. 111-321 (2010) (repealing the policy that
barred openly LGB citizens from serving in the armed forces). By the time Congress repealed Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell, some federal courts had already ruled the
policy to be unconstitutional. See, e.g., Log Cabin Republicans v. United States,
716 F. Supp. 2d 884, 929 (C.D. Cal. 2010), vacated as moot, 658 F.3d 1162 (9th
Cir. 2011) (per curiam) (“Plaintiff has demonstrated it is entitled to the relief
sought on behalf of its members, a judicial declaration that the Don’t Ask, Don’t
Tell Act violates the Fifth and First Amendments, and a permanent injunction
barring its enforcement.”).
189
See Bornstein & Bench, supra note 186, at 47.
190
See id. The Obama Administration later lifted the transgender military
ban. See Matthew Rosenberg, Transgender People Will Be Allowed to Serve
Openly in Military, N.Y. TIMES (June 30, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/
07/01/us/transgender-military.html [https://perma.cc/8F66-7HQ9]. But the
Trump administration subsequently reversed the Obama Administration’s decision and reinstituted the transgender military ban. See Julie Hirschfeld Davis &
Helene Cooper, Trump Says Transgender People Will Not Be Allowed in the Military, N.Y. TIMES (July 26, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/26/us/
politics/trump-transgender-military.html [https://perma.cc/D4YV-FNF9]. Several federal courts have already enjoined the reinstitution of the transgender
military ban. See, e.g., Doe v. Trump, 275 F. Supp. 3d 167, 217 (D.D.C. 2017)
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for more substantial protections for LGBTQ+ citizens, LGBTQ+
advocacy organizations and their allies have explored other options.191 In fact, the executive and judicial branches are responsible for bestowing most of the current LGBTQ+
protections.192
In 1998, President Bill Clinton signed Executive Order
13,087, which prohibits discrimination based on sexual orientation in the federal civilian workforce. But President Clinton
noted the limited scope of his Executive Order: “This Executive
Order states Administration policy but does not and cannot
create any new enforcement rights (such as the ability to proceed before the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission).
Those rights can be granted only by legislation passed by the
Congress, such as the Employment Non-Discrimination
Act.”193 In 2014, President Obama signed Executive Order
13,672, which adds gender identity to the classes afforded
workplace protections in the federal civilian workforce.194 Additionally, Executive Order 13,672, in tandem with Executive
Order 13,673,195 added both sexual orientation and gender
identity to the protected classes in the federal government contractor and sub-contractor workforce policy. President Trump,
however, issued an Executive Order in March 2017, that effectively guts key parts of President Obama’s Executive Orders.196
(“Plaintiffs’ motion for preliminary injunction is GRANTED, however, in that the
Court will preliminarily enjoin Defendants from enforcing the [Trump administration’s] Accession and Retention Directives . . . .”); Stone v. Trump, 280 F. Supp. 3d
747, 772 (D. Md. 2017) (“Plaintiffs’ Motion for Preliminary Injunction [relating to
the policies and directives encompassed in President Trump’s August 25, 2017
Memorandum] is GRANTED.”); Karnoski v. Trump, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
203481, at *32–33 (W.D. Wash. Dec. 11, 2017) (“The Court GRANTS Plaintiffs’
Motion for a Preliminary Injunction, and hereby enjoins [the Trump administration] from taking any action relative to transgender individuals that is inconsistent with the status quo that existed prior to President Trump’s July 26, 2017
announcement.”).
191
See Lupu, supra note 178, at 12.
192
See Bornstein & Bench, supra note 186, at 46.
193
Press Release, Office of the Press Secretary, The White House, Statement
by the President (May 28, 1998) (announcing President Clinton’s execution of
Executive Order No. 13,087, 3 C.F.R. § 13087 (1999)).
194
Exec. Order No. 13,672, 79 Fed. Reg. 42,971 (2014); see also 41 C.F.R.
§ 60-1.1 (2017) (“The purpose of the regulations in this part is to achieve the aims
of [certain Executive Orders] for the promotion and insuring of equal opportunity
for all persons, without regard to race, color, religion, sex, sexual orientation,
gender identity, or national origin, employed or seeking employment with Government contractors or with contractors performing under federally assisted construction contracts.” (emphasis added)).
195
Exec. Order No. 13,673, 81 Fed. Reg. 58,653 (2015).
196
Exec. Order No. 13,782, 82 Fed. Reg. 15,607 (2017); see also 48 C.F.R.
§ 22 (2017) (“Prescrib[ing] contracting policy and procedures for implementing

R
R
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In other words, federal government contractors and sub-contractors will again be able to discriminate based on sexual orientation and gender identity.
At the federal level, however, there are no employment nondiscrimination laws or LGTBQ+ workplace protections for employees in the private sector. Currently, members of Congress
have introduced the Equality Act, but no meaningful action has
yet been taken.197 Given the grim prospects of passing the
Equality Act into law,198 LGBTQ+ advocacy organizations and
their allies have sought alternative strategies for ensuring employment non-discrimination protections. One of these alternative strategies is arguing that Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964 prohibits employment discrimination on the basis of
sexual orientation and gender identity.
III
TITLE VII
The drafters of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 included Title
VII to eradicate employment discrimination based on race.199
But Title VII is not limited merely to employment discrimination based on race.200 Indeed, Title VII states:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or
pertinent labor laws . . . .”); Zack Ford, Trump Revokes Executive Order, Weakens
Protections for LGBT Workers, THINKPROGRESS (Mar. 29, 2017, 12:53 PM), https://
thinkprogress.org/trump-gutted-lgbt-executive-order-8dd0e3be69a/ [https://
perma.cc/N724-XUZ6] (“Enforcement of 13672, the LGBT protections, does not
require this order, but would have been stronger with it.”). Also, Executive Order
13,673 was preliminarily enjoined in October 2016. See Assoc’d Builders & Contractors of Se. Tex. v. Rung, No. 1:6-CV-425, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 155232 (E.D.
Tex. Oct. 24, 2016).
197
Equality Act of 2017, S. 1006, 115th Cong. (2017) (“A bill . . . [t]o prohibit
discrimination on the basis of sex, gender identity, and sexual orientation . . . .”);
see also infra subpart III.B. The Equality Act was introduced in the U.S. Senate
on May 2, 2017, but still has not been considered by the Senate Judiciary Committee as of August 2018. See S.1006 - Equality Act, CONGRESS.GOV, https://www.
congress.gov/bill/115th-congress/senate-bill/1006/committees?q=%7B%22
search%22%3A%5B%22Employment+Non-Discrimination+Act%22%5D%7D&r
=2 [https://perma.cc/3TYH-R9HS].
198
See e.g., Ana Valens, The LGBTQ Equality Act is Headed Back to Congress—But It Faces a Tough Crowd, DAILY DOT (Mar. 15, 2017, 6:14 AM), https://
www.dailydot.com/irl/lgbtq-equality-act-headed-back-congress-faces-toughcrowd/ [https://perma.cc/86M2-F76W] (“[W]ith the Republicans holding a majority in both the House and Senate, activists fear that the act will be shot down
before any substantial progress can be made[.]”).
199
Melissa Wasser, Note, Legal Discrimination: Bridging the Title VII Gap for
Transgender Employees, 77 OHIO ST. L.J. 1109, 1123 (2016) (citing Holloway v.
Arthur Andersen & Co., 566 F.2d 659, 662 (9th Cir. 1977)).
200
See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2012).
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otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect
to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin; or (2) to limit, segregate, or classify his
employees or applicants for employment in any way which
would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as
an employee, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.201

To bring a cognizable claim under Title VII, a plaintiff must
show that an employer adversely treated a plaintiff qualified for
the position but did not adversely treat similarly situated individuals, and the plaintiff’s race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin motivated the difference in treatment.202 For a cognizable employment discrimination claim on the basis of sex, a
plaintiff can show that an impermissible motive based on sex or
sex stereotyping caused the adverse treatment.203 Some
courts have held that the term “sex” in Title VII applies both to
sex and gender.204
A. The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
In 2012 and 2015, respectively, the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) ruled that Title VII prohibits
employment discrimination on the basis of gender identity and
sexual orientation as a form of sex discrimination.205 The
EEOC has determined that both sex-stereotyping and per se
discrimination based on sexual orientation or gender identity
are prohibited by Title VII.206 These determinations not only
201

Id.
See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973).
203
See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 250 (1989).
204
See, e.g., Schwenk v. Hartford, 204 F.3d 1187, 1202 (9th Cir. 2000) (“Thus,
under Price Waterhouse, ‘sex’ under Title VII encompasses both sex—that is, the
biological differences between men and women—and gender.”); Smith v. City of
Salem, 378 F.3d 566, 572 (6th Cir. 2004) (“As Judge Posner has pointed out, the
term ‘gender’ is one ‘borrowed from grammar to designate the sexes as viewed as
social rather than biological classes.’ . . . The Supreme Court made clear that in
the context of Title VII, discrimination because of ‘sex’ includes gender discrimination . . . .” (citation omitted)).
205
U.S. EQUAL EMP’T OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, Facts About Discrimination in Federal Government Employment Based on Marital Status, Political Affiliation, Status
as a Parent, Sexual Orientation, and Gender Identity, EEOC.gov, https://
www.eeoc.gov/federal/otherprotections.cfm [https://perma.cc/64KQ-ETYV]; see
also Baldwin v. Foxx, EEOC Appeal No. 0120133080, 2015 WL 4397641 (EEOC
July 16, 2015); Macy v. Holder, EEOC Appeal No. 0120120821, 2012 WL
1435995 (EEOC Apr. 20, 2012).
206
See, e.g., EEOC v. R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral Homes, Inc., 100 F. Supp. 3d
594 (E.D. Mich. 2015) (holding that Title VII prohibits both sex-stereotyping and
202
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bind federal agencies but federal courts may also give the determinations deference.207 This Note further discusses two of
these cases below. Attorney General Jeff Sessions and the Department of Justice, however, have since issued legal guidelines declaring that employment discrimination on the basis of
sexual orientation or gender identity is legal under Title VII.208
This has resulted in confusion concerning the law and the U.S.
government taking inconsistent positions in litigation.209
In Macy v. Holder, the EEOC ruled that discrimination on
the basis of gender identity is tantamount to sex discrimination.210 The complainant, Mia Macy, alleged that the Bureau of
Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF) discriminated
against her based on her gender identity.211 Macy applied for a
job at the ATF’s crime laboratory in Walnut Creek, California.212 After applying, she spoke with the Director of the Walper se discrimination based on gender identity); EEOC v. Lakeland Eye Clinic,
P.A., No. 8:14-CV-02421-MSS-AEP (M.D. Fla., Sept. 25, 2014) (holding that Title
VII prohibits both sex-stereotyping and per se discrimination based on gender
identity); Baldwin, 2015 WL 4397641 (holding that Title VII prohibits per se
discrimination based on sexual orientation); Macy, 2012 WL 1435995 (holding
that Title VII prohibits per se discrimination based on gender identity); Veretto v.
Donahoe, EEOC Appeal No. 0120110873, 2011 WL 2663401 (EEOC July 1, 2011)
(holding that Title VII prohibits sex-stereotyping based on sexual orientation).
207
Bornstein & Bench, supra note 186, at 41; Laura Anne Taylor, Note, A Win
for Transgender Employees: Chevron Deference for the EEOC’s Decision in Macy v.
Holder, 2013 UTAH L. REV. 1165, 1190 (2013); but see Theodore W. Wern, Note,
Judicial Deference to EEOC Interpretations of the Civil Rights Act, the ADA, and the
ADEA: Is the EEOC a Second Class Agency?, 60 OHIO ST. L.J. 1533, 1534 (1999)
(questioning whether courts are obligated to give deference to EEOC guidelines
and rules).
208
See Sari Horwitz & Spencer S. Hsu, Sessions Ends Workplace Protections
for Transgender People Under Civil Rights Act, WASH. POST (Oct. 5, 2017), https://
www.washingtonpost.com/local/public-safety/trump-administration-askscourt-to-toss-out-challenge-to-military-transgender-ban/2017/10/05/3819aec4
-a9d5-11e7-92d1-58c702d2d975_story.html?utm_term=.7f26d029d7b2 [https:/
/perma.cc/8DL3-KJA8] (“In a memo to his U.S. attorney offices and agency
heads, Sessions said that Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 does not protect
transgender people from workplace discrimination by private employers and state
and local governments.”); Alan Feuer, Justice Department Says Rights Law
Doesn’t Protect Gays, N.Y. TIMES (July 27, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/
2017/07/27/nyregion/justice-department-gays-workplace.html [https://
perma.cc/9JXQ-TAD8] (“The Justice Department has filed court papers arguing
that a major federal civil rights law does not protect employees from discrimination based on sexual orientation. . . .”).
209
See Feuer, supra note 208 (“In its brief, the Trump administration’s Justice
Department said the E.E.O.C., which had also filed court papers supporting [the
plaintiff in an employment discrimination action], was ‘not speaking for the
United States.’”).
210
Macy v. Holder, EEOC Appeal No. 0120120821, 2012 WL 1435995, at *14
(EEOC Apr. 20, 2012).
211
Id. at *1, *3.
212
Id. at *1.

R

R
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nut Creek lab, who assured Macy that she would get the
position pending a simple background check.213 But once she
disclosed her transition from male to female on her background
check, the ATF hired someone else for the position.214 The
EEOC noted that in Price Waterhouse the Supreme Court held
that under Title VII’s protection an employer may only consider
gender for employment decisions when gender is an occupational qualification.215 Therefore, the EEOC held that discrimination on the basis of gender identity violates Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 because it “by definition, [is] discrimination ‘based on . . . sex.’”216
Similarly, in Baldwin v. Foxx, the EEOC ruled that discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation equates to sex discrimination.217 The complainant, David Baldwin, alleged that
the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) discriminated
against him based on his sexual orientation.218 After working
at the FAA’s Miami facility in a temporary role and expressing
his desire for an open permanent position as a Front Line Manager, the FAA did not hire him for the position.219 Baldwin
alleged that his supervisor, who was involved in the selection
process for the permanent position, made several disparaging
comments concerning Baldwin’s sexual orientation.220 The
EEOC again cited Price Waterhouse for the proposition that
employers may not “‘rel[y] upon sex-based considerations’” or
“take gender into account when making employment decisions.”221 That proposition applies to claims brought by
LGBTQ+ complainants just as it would to heterosexual complainants.222 And because “[d]iscrimination on the basis of
sexual orientation is premised on sex-based preferences, assumptions, expectations, stereotypes, or norms,” the EEOC
concluded that discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation violates Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.223
213

Id. at *2.
Id. at *2–3.
215
Id. at *6 (citing Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 242 (1989)).
216
Id. at *11.
217
Baldwin v. Foxx, EEOC Appeal No. 0120133080, 2015 WL 4397641, at
*6–7 (EEOC July 16, 2015).
218
Id. at *1.
219
Id. at *2.
220
Id.
221
Id. at *4 (citing Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 239 (1989)).
222
Id. at *5.
223
Id.
214
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B. In the Courts
The federal courts’ findings that Title VII bans employment
discrimination on the basis of gender identity or sexual orientation have generally cited two Supreme Court cases for support.
In Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, the Supreme Court held that
employment discrimination on the basis of gender stereotyping
is unlawful sex discrimination under Title VII.224 The case involved a female senior manager, Ann Hopkins, at a nationwide
professional accounting firm.225 Some of the partners in her
office recommended Hopkins for partnership candidacy.226
The process of selecting new partners entailed the firm soliciting written comments about each partnership candidate.227
The partners ultimately decided not to admit Hopkins to the
partnership, but rather to “hold” her for reconsideration the
next year.228 Some of the comments indicated that she was too
“aggressive,” “harsh,” “difficult to work with,” “impatient,” and
“macho.”229 One partner even remarked that she needed “a
course at charm school.”230 Additionally, Hopkins was told to
“walk more femininely, talk more femininely, dress more femininely, wear make-up, have her hair styled, and wear jewelry”
to improve her partnership admission prospects.231 As a result
of this experience, Hopkins alleged that her firm, Price
Waterhouse, violated Title VII by discriminating against her
based on sex.232
Just three years prior, the Supreme Court held that sexual
harassment constitutes sex discrimination under Title VII.233
The Court, quoting City of Los Angeles Department of Water &
Power v. Manhart,234 stated that Title VII’s “because of sex”
provision includes “the entire spectrum of disparate treatment
of men and women resulting from [gender] stereotypes.”235 The
Court emphasized its view that “[the United States is] beyond
the day when an employer could evaluate employees by assuming or insisting that they matched the stereotype associated
224
225
226
227
228
229
230
231
232
233
234
235

490 U.S. at 258.
Id. at 232.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 233.
Id. at 235.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 232.
See Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 72–73 (1986).
435 U.S. 702, 707 n.13 (1978) (citation omitted).
Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 251 (1989).
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with their group . . . .”236 The Court’s reasoning ostensibly
prohibits employers from disciplining employees if they would
not similarly discipline employees of a different sex for identical
conduct or expression. Thus, Price Waterhouse seemingly “permit[s] an enormous range of discrimination claims.”237
Nine years later, in Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services,
Inc., the Supreme Court held that same-sex harassment constitutes unlawful sex discrimination under Title VII.238 The
case involved several male coworkers committing “sex-related,
humiliating actions” against the petitioner, Joseph Oncale.239
The harassment, however, did not stop there; the coworkers
also “physically assaulted Oncale in a sexual manner” and
threatened to rape him.240 Oncale complained to supervisors,
but they did nothing.241 Eventually, Oncale quit and requested
that the documentation show that he “voluntarily left due to
sexual harassment and verbal abuse.”242 Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, declared, “Title VII prohibits ‘discriminat[ion] . . . because of . . . sex’ . . . . [This] must extend to
[sex-based discrimination] of any kind that meets the statutory
requirements.”243 He reasoned that Title VII prohibits any
workplace conduct that meets the statutory requirements, including same-sex sexual harassment.244 But the Supreme
Court has never explicitly addressed the issue of extending
Title VII protections to LGBTQ+ individuals alleging employment discrimination on the basis of gender identity or sexual
236

Id.
Ian Ayres & Richard Luedeman, Tops, Bottoms, and Versatiles: What
Straight Views of Penetrative Preferences Could Mean for Sexuality Claims Under
Price Waterhouse, 123 YALE L.J. 714, 720 (2013); see also I. Bennett Capers, Note,
Sex(ual Orientation) and Title VII, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 1158, 1187 (1991) (“Because
lesbians and gays by definition undermine the notion of a binary gender system,
extension of rights to them would challenge the reward/penalization schema as it
now operates . . . . This would further not only the implicit objectives of Price
Waterhouse v. Hopkins, but also the explicit objectives of Title VII.”); Zachary A
Kramer, Note, The Ultimate Gender Stereotype: Equalizing Gender-Conforming and
Gender-Nonconforming Homosexuals Under Title VII, 2004 U. ILL. L. REV. 465, 497
(2004) (“Although originally conceived in the context of a heterosexual woman, the
gender stereotyping theory of sex discrimination [articulated in Price Waterhouse
v. Hopkins] has proved beneficial to a substantial portion of the homosexual
community . . . .”).
238
523 U.S. 75, 82 (1998).
239
Id. at 77.
240
Id.
241
Id.
242
Id.
243
Id. at 79–80.
244
Id. at 80.
237
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orientation. Thus, most federal Circuit Courts of Appeals remain reluctant to do so.245
1. Federal District Courts and Circuit Courts of Appeals
Some federal courts, however, have been willing to find a
private right of action under Title VII for employment discrimination on the basis of gender identity.246 For example, in Mickens v. General Electric Co., a federal district court denied a
defendant-employer’s motion to dismiss a Title VII sex-discrimination claim in which a transgender plaintiff-employee was
fired for supposed attendance issues.247 The supposed attendance issues, however, resulted from Mykel Mickens, the plaintiff-employee, having to use a distant bathroom after his
245
See, e.g., Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757, 762 (6th Cir. 2006)
(“[S]exual orientation is not a prohibited basis for discriminatory acts under Title
VII.”); Dawson v. Bumble & Bumble, 398 F.3d 211, 218 (2d Cir. 2005) (“[A] gender
stereotyping claim should not be used to ‘bootstrap protection for sexual orientation into Title VII.’”); Medina v. Income Support Div., 413 F.3d 1131, 1135 (10th
Cir. 2005) (“Title VII’s protections . . . do not extend to harassment due to a
person’s sexuality.”); Bibby v. Phila. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 260 F.3d 257, 261 (3d
Cir. 2001) (“Congress has repeatedly rejected legislation that would have extended
Title VII to cover sexual orientation.”); Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc.,
194 F.3d 252, 259 (1st Cir. 1999) (“Title VII does not proscribe harassment simply
because of sexual orientation.”); see also Ayres & Luedeman, supra note 237, at
719 (“Congress has repeatedly failed to include sexual orientation as an explicitly
protected category under Title VII. In deference to Congress, even the most progressive of courts have therefore only granted relief to bi/homosexual plaintiffs
who focus on their nonsexual gender-nonconformity—such as their manner of
speech or dress—rather than on their bi/homosexuality itself.”).
246
See, e.g., Kastl v. Maricopa Cty. Cmty. Coll. Dist., 325 Fed. Appx. 492, 493
(9th Cir. 2009) (“[T]ransgender individuals may state viable sex discrimination
claims on the theory that the perpetrator was motivated by the victim’s real or
perceived non-conformance to socially-constructed gender norms. After [Price
Waterhouse v.] Hopkins and Schwenk [v. Hartford], it is unlawful to discriminate
against a transgender (or any other) person because he or she does not behave in
accordance with an employer’s expectations for men or women.”); Roberts v. Clark
Cty. Sch. Dist., 215 F. Supp. 3d 1001, 1014 (D. Nev. 2016) (“[B]ecause it appears
that the Ninth Circuit would hold that gender-identity discrimination is actionable under Title VII, I see no reason to depart from the heavy weight of this authority. Nothing in the few contrary decisions cited by the [defendant] persuades me
otherwise. The contrary Seventh and Tenth Circuit decisions provide no cogent
analysis of Title VII’s language or Supreme Court caselaw.”); Doe v. Arizona, No.
CV-15-02399-PHX-DGC, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 36229, at *6 (D. Ariz. Mar. 21,
2016) (“Plaintiff states that he is transgender, thereby satisfying the ‘protected
status’ element of a gender discrimination claim. Plaintiff alleges that his supervisors have tolerated harassment of him and have breached his confidentiality by
informing prison inmates of his transition. These allegations satisfy the ‘adverse
employment action’ and ‘disparate treatment’ elements of a gender discrimination
claim.” (citations omitted)).
247
No. 3:16CV-00603-JHM, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 163961, at *9–10 (W.D.
Ky. Nov. 29, 2016).

R
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employer denied him use of a more proximal male bathroom.248
Additionally, Mickens’s supervisor targeted Mickens for harassment and reprimand and told Mickens that nothing could
be done about it.249 The court acknowledged that the Sixth
Circuit and the Supreme Court were in a position at the time to
address the issue of discrimination on the basis of gender identity, albeit in the context of Title IX.250 Nonetheless, the court
held that Mickens sufficiently pled that his employer discriminated against him because “he did not conform to the gender
stereotype of what someone who was born female should look
and act like.”251
Similarly, in Chavez v. Credit Nation Auto Sales, the Eleventh Circuit reversed summary judgment for the defendantemployer when the plaintiff-employee claimed that she was terminated because she was transgender and there was sufficient
circumstantial evidence to create triable issues of fact concerning “her employer’s discriminatory intent” and “[her employer’s]
gender bias [as] ‘a motivating factor’ in [her termination].”252
The plaintiff-employee, Jennifer Chavez, met with the president
of her employer, Credit Nation, to discuss her gender transition.253 At this meeting, the president said he was “nervous”
about Chavez’s “condition,” told Chavez not to “bring up” the
issue of her transition, and instructed Chavez not to wear “a
dress or miniskirt.”254 A few days later, Credit Nation’s vice
president told Chavez to “tone it down” and to be “‘very careful’
because [the president] ‘didn’t like’ the implications of Chavez’s
planned gender transition.”255 After disclosing her gender
transition, Chavez became the subject of heightened scrutiny
and unusual discipline.256 Finally, Credit Nation did not follow
its own policies in the events leading up to Chavez’s termination.257 The court, considering the totality of this evidence,
248

Id. at *2–3.
Id. at *3.
250
Id. at *9 (citing G.G. ex rel. Grimm v. Gloucester Cty. Sch. Bd., 822 F.3d
709 (4th Cir. 2016), cert. granted in part, 137 S. Ct. 369 (2016); Bd. of Educ. of the
Highland Local Sch. Dist. v. U.S. Dept. of Educ., No. 2:16-CV-524, 2016 WL
6125403 (S.D. Ohio Oct. 20, 2016), aff’d sub nom. Dodds v. U.S. Dept. of Educ.,
845 F.3d 217, 222 (6th Cir. 2016)).
251
Id. at *9 (“[W]hat is clear is that the Plaintiff’s complaint sufficiently alleges
facts to support discrimination or disparate treatment claims based upon . . .
gender non-conformity or sex stereotyping.”).
252
641 Fed. Appx. 883, 892 (11th Cir. 2016).
253
Id. at 885.
254
Id. at 890–91.
255
Id. at 891.
256
Id.
257
Id. at 892.
249
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determined that Chavez put forth sufficient evidence to constitute a triable issue of fact concerning her Title VII claim.258
Most recently, in EEOC v. R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral
Homes, Inc., the Sixth Circuit reversed summary judgment for
the employer–defendant and granted summary judgment for
the EEOC on behalf of the employee–plaintiff.259 In doing so,
the court held that Title VII prohibits discrimination on the
basis of gender identity.260 The case involved a funeral home
director, Aimee Stephens, who worked for a closely held forprofit funeral home.261 The funeral home’s mission statement
reflected the Christian values of its owners, and its dress policy
imposed different requirements for male and female employees.262 The owner of the funeral home terminated Stephens
after Stephens informed him that she would be transitioning
from male to female.263 Additionally, she had indicated that
she would be dressing as a woman while at work.264 Although
the Sixth Circuit noted that the district court correctly held
that Stephens was fired due to sex stereotyping, it also noted
that the district court erred when determining that discrimination based on gender identity is not actionable under Title
VII.265 The court cited to Hively v. Ivy Tech Community College
of Indiana,266 Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins,267 G.G. v. Gloucester County School Board,268 Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc.,269 and Zarda v. Altitude Express270 for support.271

258

Id.
EEOC v. R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral Homes, Inc., 884 F.3d 560, 599 (6th
Cir. 2018).
260
Id. at 580 (“[W]e hold that the EEOC could pursue a claim under Title VII
on the ground that the Funeral Home discriminated against Stephens on the
basis of her transgender status and transitioning identity.”).
261
Id. at 566.
262
Id. at 567–69.
263
Id. at 569.
264
Id.
265
Id. at 574–82.
266
853 F.3d 339 (7th Cir. 2017) (en banc); see also infra pp. 272–73 (discussing Hively).
267
490 U.S. 228 (1989).
268
822 F.3d 709 (4th Cir. 2016); see also infra note 342 (discussing the
Supreme Court’s decision to vacate and remand the Fourth Circuit’s decision).
269
523 U.S. 75 (1998).
270
883 F.3d 100 (2d Cir. 2018) (en banc); see also infra pp. 273–74 (discussing Zarda).
271
EEOC v. R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral Homes, Inc., 884 F.3d 560, 574–78
(6th Cir. 2018).
259

R
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The same is true for employment discrimination on the
basis of sexual orientation.272 For example, in EEOC v. Scott
Medical Health Center, a federal district court denied a defendant–employer’s motion to dismiss, ruling, “Title VII’s ‘because
of sex’ provision prohibits discrimination on the basis of sexual
orientation.”273 The case involved a telemarketing manager
making offensive remarks to an employee, Dale Baxley, based
on Baxley’s sexual orientation.274 Baxley is a gay man and had
a male partner.275 Baxley’s employer, Scott Medical Health
Center, later constructively terminated him.276 The EEOC discovered the workplace discrimination and sexual harassment
directed at Baxley in the course of a separate investigation
concerning the same manager’s workplace discrimination and
sexual harassment directed at five of Baxley’s former female
coworkers.277 The EEOC filed a complaint against Scott Medical Health Center on behalf of Baxley, alleging that the manager’s conduct created a hostile work environment and violated
Title VII.278 The court rejected Scott Medical Health Center’s
contention that Title VII does not prohibit discrimination based
on sexual orientation.279 The district court reasoned that the
Supreme Court’s decision in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins280
and Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc.281 compelled
its finding that Title VII protected employees from workplace
discrimination based on sexual orientation.282 In reaching its
272
See, e.g., Videckis v. Pepperdine Univ., 150 F. Supp. 3d 1151, 1159 (C.D.
Cal. 2015) (“[T]he line between sex discrimination and sexual orientation discrimination is ‘difficult to draw’ because that line does not exist, save as a lingering and
faulty judicial construct.”); Isaacs v. Felder Servs., LLC, 143 F. Supp. 3d 1190,
1193 (M.D. Ala. 2015) (“[T]he Equal Employment Opportunity Commission [correctly concluded] that claims of sexual orientation-based discrimination are cognizable under Title VII.”).
273
217 F. Supp. 3d 834, 839 (W.D. Pa. 2016).
274
Id. at 836 (“Specifically, the Complaint alleges [the telemarketing manager]
‘routinely made unwelcome and offensive comments about [Mr.] Baxley, including
but not limited to regularly calling him “fag,” “faggot,” “[expletive] faggot,” and
“queer,” and making statements such as “[expletive] queer can’t do your job.”’”).
275
Id.
276
Id.
277
Id.
278
Id. at 835.
279
Id. at 839–40 (“The Court sees no meaningful difference between sexual
orientation discrimination and discrimination ‘because of sex’ [under Title VII].”).
280
490 U.S. 228 (1989).
281
523 U.S. 75 (1998).
282
Scott Med. Health Ctr., 217 F. Supp. 3d at 841 (“Forcing an employee to fit
into a gendered expectation—whether that expectation involves physical traits,
clothing, mannerisms or sexual attraction—constitutes sex stereotyping and,
under Price Waterhouse, violates Title VII. Simply put, [the telemarketing manager’s] alleged conduct toward Mr. Baxley ‘stemmed from an impermissibly
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decision, the court also noted that other federal district courts
have reached the same conclusion.283 Finally, the court cited
Obergefell to suggest that there is “a growing recognition of
the illegality of discrimination on the basis of sexual
orientation.”284
Similarly, in Hively v. Ivy Tech Community College Of Indiana,285 the en banc Seventh Circuit reversed dismissal of the
plaintiff–employee’s complaint alleging a Title VII violation.286
In doing so, the Seventh Circuit seemingly overruled contrary
prior precedent and held that Title VII’s prohibition on sex discrimination extends to discrimination on the basis of sexual
orientation.287 Hively involved an openly lesbian adjunct professor at Ivy Tech Community College (Ivy Tech).288 Ivy Tech
denied Kimberly Hively’s application to become a full-time professor at least six times between 2009 and 2014.289 Additionally, in 2014, Ivy Tech refused to renew Hively’s part-time
contract.290 Alleging that Ivy Tech denied her applications on
the basis of her sexual orientation in violation of Title VII,
Hively filed a pro se complaint against her former employer.291
The district court dismissed Hively’s complaint with prejudice
for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted,292
which a panel of the Seventh Circuit affirmed.293 The Seventh
Circuit then vacated the panel’s decision and granted a rehearcabined view of the proper behavior’ of men. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at
236–37.”).
283
Id. at 841–42 (citing Isaacs v. Felder Servs., LLC, 143 F. Supp. 3d 1190
(M.D. Ala. 2015); Videckis v. Pepperdine Univ., 150 F. Supp. 3d 1151 (C.D. Cal.
2015); Terveer v. Billington, 34 F. Supp. 3d 100 (D.D.C. 2014); Heller v. Columbia
Edgewater Country Club, 195 F. Supp. 2d 1212 (D. Or. 2002)).
284
Scott Med. Health Ctr., 217 F. Supp. 3d at 842 (citing Obergefell v. Hodges,
135 S. Ct. 2584, 2590 (2015)).
285
853 F.3d 339, 352 (7th Cir. 2017) (en banc).
286
For a more comprehensive overview and analysis of the Hively opinion, see
Camille Patti, Case Note, Hively v. Ivy Tech Community College: Losing the Battle
but Winning the War for Title VII Sexual Orientation Discrimination Protection, 26
TUL. J.L. & SEXUALITY 133 (2017). Although the Seventh Circuit noted that Baldwin v. Foxx is merely persuasive authority, the court found the EEOC’s rationale
to be quite persuasive. See id. at 139–40.
287
Hively, 853 F.3d at 341–43, 352 (noting and seemingly overruling Hamner
v. St. Vincent Hosp. & Health Care Ctr., Inc., 224 F.3d 701 (7th Cir. 2000) and
Spearman v. Ford Motor Co., 231 F.3d 1080 (7th Cir. 2000)).
288
Hively, 853 F.3d at 341.
289
Id.
290
Id.
291
Id.
292
Hively v. Ivy Tech Cmty. Coll., No. 3:14-cv-1791, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
25813, at *6 (N.D. Ind. Mar. 3, 2015).
293
Hively v. Ivy Tech Cmty. Coll., 830 F.3d 698, 718 (7th Cir. 2016), rev’d en
banc 853 F.3d 339, 352 (7th Cir. 2017).
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ing en banc,294 at which the full Seventh Circuit held that
Hively’s Title VII claim may proceed and that Title VII prohibits
employment discrimination based on sexual orientation.295
The court noted that the decision “must be understood against
the backdrop of the Supreme Court’s decisions”296 in Price
Waterhouse v. Hopkins,297 Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc.,298 Romer v. Evans,299 Lawrence v. Texas,300 United
States v. Windsor,301 and Obergefell v. Hodges,302 as well as the
EEOC’s decision in Baldwin v. Foxx.303 This monumental decision by the en banc Seventh Circuit created a circuit split.304
Most recently, in Zarda v. Altitude Express, Inc., the en
banc Second Circuit held that the employee–plaintiff’s claim of
discrimination based on sexual orientation against the employer–defendant is actionable under Title VII.305 In doing so,
the Second Circuit overturned prior precedents that held that
discrimination based on sexual orientation is not prohibited by
Title VII.306 The case involved an employer–defendant termi294
Hively v. Ivy Tech Cmty. Coll., No. 15-1720, 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 20302,
at *1 (7th Cir. Oct. 11, 2016).
295
Hively, 853 F.3d at 352.
296
Id. at 349–50.
297
490 U.S. 228 (1989).
298
523 U.S. 75 (1998).
299
517 U.S. 620 (1996).
300
539 U.S. 558 (2003).
301
133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013).
302
135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
303
EEOC Appeal No. 0120133080, 2015 WL 4397641 (EEOC July 16, 2015).
304
Hively v. Ivy Tech Cmty. Coll., 853 F.3d 339, 341–42 (7th Cir. 2017) (en
banc) (citing Kalich v. AT&T Mobility, LLC, 679 F.3d 464, 471 (6th Cir. 2012));
Prowel v. Wise Bus. Forms, Inc., 579 F.3d 285, 290 (3d Cir. 2009); Dawson v.
Bumble & Bumble, 398 F.3d 211, 217 (2d Cir. 2005); Medina v. Income Support
Div., 413 F.3d 1131, 1135 (10th Cir. 2005); Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe,
Inc., 194 F.3d 252, 259 (1st Cir. 1999); Fredette v. BVP Mgmt. Assocs., 112 F.3d
1503, 1510 (11th Cir. 1997); Wrightson v. Pizza Hut of Am., Inc., 99 F.3d 138, 143
(4th Cir. 1996); Williamson v. A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc., 876 F.2d 69, 70 (8th
Cir. 1989); Blum v. Gulf Oil Corp., 597 F.2d 936, 938 (5th Cir. 1979)).
305
Zarda v. Altitude Express, Inc., 883 F.3d 100, 132 (2d Cir. 2018) (en banc)
(“Although sexual orientation discrimination is ‘assuredly not the principal evil
that Congress was concerned with when it enacted Title VII,’ ‘statutory prohibitions often go beyond the principal evil to cover reasonably comparable evils.’ In
the context of Title VII, the statutory prohibition extends to all discrimination
‘because of . . . sex’ and sexual orientation discrimination is an actionable subset
of sex discrimination.” (citations omitted)).
306
Id. at 132 (overturning Dawson v. Bumble & Bumble, 398 F.3d 211 (2d Cir.
2005) and Simonton v. Runyon, 232 F.3d 33 (2d Cir. 2000)). The Second Circuit
also noted the cases in its “sister circuits” that were consistent with Simonton and
Dawson. Id. at 107 (citing Kalich v. AT&T Mobility, LLC, 679 F.3d 464, 471 (6th
Cir. 2012); Prowel v. Wise Bus. Forms, Inc., 579 F.3d 285, 290 (3d Cir. 2009);
Medina v. Income Support Div., 413 F.3d 1131, 1135 (10th Cir. 2005); Hamner v.
St. Vincent Hosp. & Health Care Ctr., Inc., 224 F.3d 701, 704 (7th Cir. 2000);
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nating an employee–plaintiff because of his sexual orientation.307 Donald Zarda, the employee–plaintiff, served as a
skydiving instructor at Altitude Express.308 Donald Zarda also
was a gay man.309 Zarda often disclosed his homosexuality to
the female clients which he would be connected to during the
skydive when they were accompanied by their husband or boyfriend.310 He did so to prevent any awkwardness resulting
from his contact with the women during the skydiving.311 On
one occasion, a woman informed her boyfriend of Zarda’s sexuality while discussing their skydives.312 The boyfriend complained about Zarda’s behavior to Altitude Express.313 Altitude
Express terminated Zarda soon after receiving the complaint.314 Similar to the full Seventh Circuit in Hively,315 the
full Second Circuit noted that the case is heavily influenced by
the Supreme Court’s decisions in Price Waterhouse and Oncale,
among others.316
Prior to this momentous decision by the full Second Circuit, two recent panels of the Second Circuit held that Title VII
does not extend to discrimination based on sexual orientation
because they are bound by prior precedent.317 In one of the
panel decisions, Chief Judge Katzmann proposed that the full
Second Circuit “revisit” the question concerning Title VII and

Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc., 194 F.3d 252, 259 (1st Cir. 1999);
Wrightson v. Pizza Hut of Am., Inc., 99 F.3d 138, 143 (4th Cir. 1996); Williamson
v. A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc., 876 F.2d 69, 70 (8th Cir. 1989); Blum v. Gulf Oil
Corp., 597 F.2d 936, 938 (5th Cir. 1979)).
307
Id. at 109.
308
Id. at 108.
309
Id.
310
Id.
311
Id.
312
Id.
313
Id.
314
Id. at 109.
315
Hively v. Ivy Tech Cmty. Coll., 853 F.3d 339, 349–50 (7th Cir. 2017) (en
banc).
316
Zarda, 883 F. 3d at 119–21.
317
See Christiansen v. Omnicom Grp., Inc., 852 F.3d 195, 199 (2d Cir. 2017)
(citing Dawson v. Bumble & Bumble, 398 F.3d 211 (2d Cir. 2005) and Simonton v.
Runyon, 232 F.3d 33 (2d Cir. 2000)); Zarda v. Altitude Express, 855 F.3d 76, 82
(2d Cir. 2017) (citing Simonton and Omnicom). Both the Omnicom and Zarda
panels, however, noted that gender stereotyping is actionable under Title VII. See
Omnicom, 852 F.3d at 200–201; Zarda, 855 F.3d at 82. Before the Omnicom and
Zarda panels held that Title VII does not extend to discrimination based on sexual
orientation, panels of the Second Circuit made similar determinations in Dawson
and Simonton. See Dawson, 398 F.3d at 218; Simonton, 232 F.3d at 36.
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discrimination based on sexual orientation.318 The Second
Circuit then vacated these panel decisions and granted a rehearing en banc to determine whether Title VII prohibits discrimination based on sexual orientation.319 The Second
Circuit, sitting en banc, heard oral arguments for Zarda on
September 26, 2017.320 The Second Circuit panel determined
that “Zarda may receive a new trial only if Title VII’s prohibition
on sex discrimination encompasses discrimination based on
sexual orientation—a result foreclosed by Simonton.”321 Although the panel noted that it is bound by controlling precedent, the court intimated that Zarda would be entitled to a new
trial if Title VII prohibited employment discrimination based on
sexual orientation.322 It seems likely that Altitude Express will
appeal the case to the Supreme Court.
2. Evans v. Georgia Regional Hospital
Although some of the Circuit Courts of Appeals have ruled
on the issue, the Supreme Court has never expressly decided
whether federal workplace protections apply on the basis of
sexual orientation and gender identity.323 In the 2017-2018
Term, the Supreme Court passed on an opportunity to extend
Title VII protections to LGBTQ+ individuals.324 Indeed, the
Court refused to grant Jameka Evans’s petition for writ of certiorari after the Eleventh Circuit dismissed her lawsuit claiming
employment discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation
318
Omnicom, 852 F.3d at 202 (Katzmann, C.J., concurring) (noting the
“changing legal landscape that has taken shape in the nearly two decades since
Simonton issued”).
319
Zarda v. Altitude Express, Inc., No. 15-3775, 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 13127,
at *6 (2d Cir. May 25, 2017).
320
See Erin Mulvaney & Andrew Denney, Gov’t Agencies Spar in Second Circuit Over LGBTQ Rights, LAW.COM (Sept. 26, 2017, 8:44 PM), https://
www.law.com/sites/almstaff/2017/09/26/govt-agencies-spar-in-second-circuit-over-lgbtq-rights/ [https://perma.cc/HL3Y-F65S].
321
Zarda, 855 F.3d at 82.
322
Id. (“In sum, if Title VII protects against sexual-orientation discrimination,
then Zarda would be entitled to a new trial.”).
323
See Kelly M. Peña, LGBT Discrimination in the Workplace: What Will the
Future Hold?, 92 FLA. BAR J. 35, 36 (2018).
324
See Andrew Chung, U.S. High Court Turns Away Dispute Over Gay Worker
Protections, REUTERS (Dec. 11, 2017, 9:36 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/
us-usa-court-lgbt/u-s-high-court-turns-away-dispute-over-gay-worker-protections-idUSKBN1E51OT [https://perma.cc/7TM6-VQLH ] (“The U.S. Supreme
Court on Monday refused to hear an appeal by a Georgia security guard who said
she was harassed and forced from her job because she is a lesbian, avoiding an
opportunity to decide whether a federal law that bans gender-based bias also
outlaws discrimination based on sexual orientation.”).
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and gender non-conformity.325 Evans was a gay woman who
identified with the male gender, and faced a hostile work environment because of her identity.326 She alleged that during
her tenure as a security officer at Georgia Regional Hospital,
she was “denied equal pay or work, harassed, . . . physically
assaulted or battered[,] . . . [and] discriminated against on the
basis of her sex and targeted for termination for failing to carry
herself in a ‘traditional womanly manner.’”327 Evans further
alleges that the hospital punished and retaliated against her
after she informed its human resources personnel of the hostility and unfair discrimination she faced.328
In her pro se complaint, Evans argues that Title VII’s prohibition of employment discrimination on the basis of sex extends to her claims of discrimination based on sexual
orientation and gender non-conformity.329 A magistrate judge
recommended dismissing claims with prejudice for failure to
plead an actionable claim, which the district court adopted.330
Reviewing the case de novo, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the
district court’s dismissal of Evans’s claim of discrimination
based on sexual orientation,331 but vacated and remanded with
instructions to allow Evans leave to amend her claim of discrimination based on gender non-conformity.332
The Eleventh Circuit held that the district court correctly
dismissed Evans’s sexual orientation claim because Title VII
does not extend to discrimination based on sexual orientation.333 The court cited Blum v. Gulf Oil Corp.,334 which held
that Title VII does not prohibit an employer from terminating
an employee on the basis of sexual orientation.335 The Eleventh Circuit also rejected Evans’s argument that Price
Waterhouse and Oncale336 support extending Title VII to dis325
See Evans v. Ga. Reg’l Hosp., 850 F.3d 1248, 1250 (11th Cir. 2017), cert.
denied 138 S. Ct. 557 (2017).
326
Id. at 1251.
327
Id.
328
Id. at 1250–52.
329
Id. at 1252.
330
Id.
331
Id. at 1257.
332
Id. at 1255.
333
Id.
334
597 F.2d 936, 938 (5th Cir. 1979).
335
See Evans, 850 F.3d at 1255. Although Blum is a Fifth Circuit case, the
Eleventh Circuit has held that any decision from the former Fifth Circuit preceding September 20, 1981 is binding precedent. See id. at 1255 n.4 (citing Bonner
v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc)).
336
See supra subpart III.B.
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crimination based on sexual orientation.337 Furthermore, although the Eleventh Circuit held that Title VII prohibits
discrimination based on gender non-conformity, the court concluded that Evans had yet to plead facts indicating that the
hospital punished and retaliated against her based on her gender non-conformity.338 Nonetheless, the Eleventh Circuit ruled
that the district court erred in failing to provide Evans an opportunity to amend her complaint.339 Evans appealed to the
Supreme Court, which denied certiorari.340
By denying Evans’s petition, the Supreme Court failed to
live up to the words engraved on the pediment of its building. If
the United States is to truly afford its citizens “equal justice
under law,” as South Africa does, the Supreme Court should
have granted certiorari, reversed the Eleventh Circuit’s decision, and extended Title VII to cover gender identity and sexual
orientation. Fortunately, the Supreme Court will likely get a
second opportunity once the Second Circuit decides the Zarda
case.341 One must wonder, however, whether the Supreme
Court will grant certiorari for the Zarda case since the Court
denied certiorari in the Evans case.342 In the absence of a
337
Evans, 850 F.3d at 1256 (“The fact that claims for gender non-conformity
and same-sex discrimination can be brought pursuant to Title VII does not permit
us to depart from Blum. . . . Price Waterhouse and Oncale are neither clearly on
point nor contrary to Blum.”).
338
Id. at 1254.
339
Id.
340
See Evans v. Ga. Reg’l Hosp., 138 S. Ct. 557, 557 (2017) (denying Evans’s
petition for writ of certiorari).
341
Zarda v. Altitude Express, Inc., 855 F.3d 76 (2d Cir. 2017), reh’g en banc
granted, No. 15-3775, 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 13127, at *6 (2d Cir. May 25, 2017);
cf. Ariane de Vogue, LGBT Employment Cases on Road to Supreme Court, CNN
(Sept. 26, 2017, 6:24 AM), https://www.cnn.com/2017/09/26/politics/lgbt-employment-case/index.html [https://perma.cc/CA2S-Q3G7] (discussing Hively,
Evans, and Zarda).
342
Cf. Patricia N. Jjemba, Expanding the Scope of Title VII: Will Sexual Orientation Become a New Basis for Employment Discrimination?, CBA RECORD, September 2017, at 40, 41 (“The plaintiff in Zarda may not have been an ideal plaintiff to
further the theory of sex discrimination on sexual orientation grounds. . . . The
split between circuits already exists, and Ms. Jameka Evans of Atlanta, Georgia
may present the right set of facts for the Supreme Court to hear her case.”
(citation omitted)). Evans and Zarda deal predominantly with extending the
“based on sex” provision in Title VII to cover sexual orientation. But the Supreme
Court also has the opportunity to conclude that “based on sex” also includes
discrimination based on gender identity, albeit in the context of Title IX. See
Whitaker v. Kenosha Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1, 858 F.3d 1034, 1039 (7th Cir. 2017)
(holding that Title IX’s “based on sex” provision prohibits discrimination based on
gender-identity), petition for cert. filed, No. 17-301, 2018 WL 1147062 (Mar. 5,
2018). The Court was able to dodge a similar question in 2017 after the Trump
administration rescinded the Obama Administration’s protections for transgender
students in public schools. See Gloucester Cty. Sch. Bd. v. G.G., 137 S. Ct. 1239,
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Supreme Court ruling extending Title VII protections to
LGBTQ+ individuals, Congress must act by passing robust
workplace protections for LGBTQ+ citizens.343
IV
PROPOSED PIECES OF LEGISLATION IN CONGRESS
A. The Employment Non-Discrimination Act
The Employment Non-Discrimination Act (ENDA) prohibits
employment discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation
and gender identity.344 ENDA, in its current form, states:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or
otherwise discriminate against any individual with respect to
the compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment of the individual, because of such individual’s actual or
perceived sexual orientation or gender identity; or (2) to limit,
segregate, or classify the employees or applicants for employment of the employer in any way that would deprive or tend
to deprive any individual of employment or otherwise adversely affect the status of the individual as an employee,
because of such individual’s actual or perceived sexual orientation or gender identity.345

ENDA’s language is nearly identical to that of Title VII.346
ENDA also prohibits employers from retaliating against any
employee who reports an employer for violating ENDA.347
After previous defeats and a lack of success, LGBTQ+ advocacy organizations and their allies altered their strategy con1239 (2017) (“Judgment vacated, and case remanded to the . . . Fourth Circuit for
further consideration in light of the guidance document issued by the Department
of Education and Department of Justice on February 22, 2017.”); see also Emma
Green, The Trump Administration May Have Doomed Gavin Grimm’s Case, ATLANTIC (Mar. 6, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2017/03/thetrump-administration-may-have-doomed-gavin-grimm/518676/ [https://perma
.cc/A2P4-WUSZ ] (“The Supreme Court sent an important case concerning a
transgender student in Virginia back down to the Fourth Circuit . . . in part
because of the Trump administration’s new position on the issues involved in the
case.”).
343
Cf. Symone D. Shinton, Married on Saturday, Fired on Monday: The Seventh Circuit Attempts to Navigate LGBT Rights After Obergefell, 12 SEVENTH CIR.
REV. 33, 61 (2016) (“Regardless of how the Seventh Circuit rules in Hively, Congress must act to provide protections for LGBT[Q+] employees against this invidious discrimination.”).
344
Employment Non-Discrimination Act of 2013, H.R. 1755, 113th Cong.
(2013); Employment Non-Discrimination Act of 2013, S. 815, 113th Cong. (2013).
Together, hereinafter referred to as the Employment Non-Discrimination Act.
345
Id.
346
See supra note 201 and accompanying text.
347
Employment Non-Discrimination Act, supra note 344.

R
R
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cerning federal legislation in the 1970s.348 Instead of pursuing
an amendment to the Civil Rights Act of 1964,349 they began
advocating for “a more politically expedient, standalone bill”
focusing exclusively on employment non-discrimination.350 In
1994, members of Congress first introduced ENDA which they
modeled on the Americans with Disabilities Act from just a few
years prior.351 The bill, however, only included protections for
LGB individuals.352 In 2007, Congressman Barney Frank introduced a version of ENDA that also included protections for
transgender individuals.353 The 2013 version of ENDA also
includes protections for both sexual orientation and gender
identity.354 Although ENDA passed the Senate in 2013,355
Speaker John Boehner refused to bring the bill to the floor of
the House of Representatives for a vote.356 LGBTQ+ advocacy
organizations and their allies thereafter deserted ENDA and
focused their efforts on the Equality Act.357
B. The Equality Act
In 1974, Congresswoman Bella Abzug and Congressman
Ed Koch introduced the Equality Act in Congress.358 Congresswoman Abzug’s bill, however, only extended protections
to LGB citizens.359 And not a single other member of Congress
348
See Alex Reed, Abandoning ENDA, 51 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 277, 281–82
(2014) [hereinafter Abandoning ENDA].
349
See infra subpart IV.B.
350
Bornstein & Bench, supra note 186, at 48.
351
Id.; see also Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336,
104 Stat. 327 (1990) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 12101).
352
Shalyn L. Caulley, Note, The Next Frontier to LGBT Equality: Securing Workplace-Discrimination Protections, 2017 U. ILL. L. REV. 909, 929 (2017).
353
Wasser, supra note 199, at 1116.
354
Employment Non-Discrimination Act, supra note 344.
355
Caulley, supra note 352, at 929.
356
Wasser, supra note 199, at 1118.
357
Id.
358
See Equality Act of 1974, H.R. 14752, 93d Cong. (1974); Alex Reed, A ProTrans Argument for a Transexclusive Employment Non-Discrimination Act, 50 AM.
BUS. L.J. 835, 838 (2013) [hereinafter Transexclusive Employment Non-Discrimination Act]; see also David G. Dodge, The Equality Act Turns 40, HUFFINGTON POST
(May 29, 2014, 6:03 PM), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/david-g-dodge/theequality-act-turns-40_b_5352209.html [https://perma.cc/VL49-ELUJ] (“In May
of 1974, New York Representatives Bella Abzug and Ed Koch introduced the
‘Equality Act’ into Congress. . . . It’s unfortunately a bittersweet anniversary; 40
years later—in a year when we’ve seen the first openly gay player drafted to the
NFL and same-sex marriage bans are falling across the country on a weekly
basis—we still lack federal anti-discrimination protections for LGBTQ[+] people.”).
359
See Equality Act of 1974, H.R. 14752 (prohibiting discrimination based on
sex, marital status, and sexual orientation in public accommodation, federally
assisted programs, and the public sector).

R

R
R
R
R
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signed onto the bill as a cosponsor.360 The bill died in committee without a vote.361 In subsequent Congresses, members of
Congress reintroduced the Equality Act or an equivalent bill.362
While the bills increasingly gained support from cosponsoring
members of Congress, the bills died in committee each time.363
The Equality Act reappeared in July 2015, after LGBTQ+ advocacy organizations and their allies had abandoned their push
for ENDA.364
The Equality Act is similar, but not identical to ENDA.365
While ENDA is a stand-alone piece of legislation that applies
specifically to LGBTQ+ individuals, the Equality Act serves to
add protections for LGBTQ+ individuals by amending existing
civil rights laws.366 Amongst these civil rights laws is the Civil
Rights Act of 1964.367 In the context of employment non-discrimination, the Equality Act would amend Title VII to include
sexual orientation and gender identity.368 The Equality Act
thus provides more robust and comprehensive protections for
LGBTQ+ individuals—in the employment context and
beyond.369
The Equality Act and amending Title VII, according to Professor Alex Reed, have other advantages as well. First, the
Equality Act and Title VII provide plaintiffs with the ability to
contest discrimination on either a disparate treatment theory
or a disparate impact theory.370 ENDA, however, only allows
for discrimination claims on the basis of disparate treatment.371 Second, the Equality Act and Title VII forbid religious
360

See Transexclusive Employment Non-Discrimination Act, supra note 358, at

R

838.
361

See id.
Bornstein & Bench, supra note 186, at 48.
363
Id.; see also William C. Sung, Note, Taking the Fight Back to Title VII: A
Case for Redefining “Because of Sex” to Include Gender Stereotypes, Sexual Orientation, and Gender Identity, 84 S. CAL. L. REV. 487, 495–514 (2011) (recounting
the history of the Equality Act and equivalent bills).
364
Wasser, supra note 199, at 1119.
365
See Equality Act, H.R. 3185, 114th Cong. (2015); Equality Act, S. 1858,
114th Cong. (2015). Together, hereinafter referred to as the Equality Act.
366
Wasser, supra note 199, at 1119.
367
See id.; see generally Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat.
241 (prohibiting discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin in various contexts). The other civil rights laws include: The Fair Housing
Act, the Equal Credit Opportunity Act, and the Jury Selection Service Act. See
Wasser, supra note 199, at 1119.
368
See Equality Act, supra note 365; see also 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2012).
369
Wasser, supra note 199, at 1119.
370
Abandoning ENDA, supra note 348, at 280–81 (citing Ricci v. DeStefano,
557 U.S. 557, 577–78 (2009)).
371
Abandoning ENDA, supra note 348, at 281.
362

R

R

R

R
R
R
R
R
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organizations from discriminating on the basis of race, color,
national origin, and sex.372 Amending Title VII to include sexual orientation and gender identity would presumably also prohibit religious organizations from discriminating on these
grounds as well.373 ENDA, on the other hand, allows religious
organizations to discriminate on the basis of sexual orientation
and gender identity.374 Finally, the Equality Act and Title VII
permit employers to implement temporary affirmative action
plans to diversify their workforce.375 This provision is similar
to that of the PEPUDA and EEA.376 ENDA prohibits using quotas or giving special treatment to individuals based on their
sexual orientation or gender identity.377
In sum, although ENDA is a step in the right direction, its
protections for LGBTQ+ individuals are modest compared to
the more comprehensive protections included in the Equality
Act and Title VII. Thus, in order to more closely follow South
Africa’s robust and progressive protections for its LGBTQ+ citizens, the U.S. Congress should pass the Equality Act. Until
that time, LGBTQ+ individuals will remain second-class citizens whose employers may discriminate against them at will.
C. Progress in the Private Sector
Even without federal laws such as ENDA or the Equality
Act mandating employment non-discrimination,378 many companies still provide equal rights and benefits to LGBTQ+ individuals. The Human Rights Campaign’s annual Corporate
Equality Index (CEI) report scores large businesses based on
their “policies, benefits[,] and practices” pertinent to LGBTQ+
employees and their families.379 The Human Rights Campaign
invites Fortune magazine’s 1,000 largest publicly traded businesses and American Lawyer magazine’s top 200 revenuegrossing law firms to participate, while any private-sector business with 500 or more full-time employees can request to par372

Id.
Id.
374
Id.
375
Id.
376
See supra subpart I.C.
377
Abandoning ENDA, supra note 348, at 281.
378
See supra subparts II.A–B.
379
HUMAN RTS. CAMPAIGN FOUND., CORPORATE EQUALITY INDEX 2017: RATING
WORKPLACES ON LESBIAN, GAY, BISEXUAL AND TRANSGENDER EQUALITY 2 (2017) [hereinafter CEI 2017], https://assets.hrc.org//files/assets/resources/CEI-2017-Fi
nal.pdf?_ga=2.248875847.1322983219.1509835382-537092078.1506700197
[https://perma.cc/G9JP-KJ2B].
373
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ticipate.380 The 2017 CEI report shows that 515 major
businesses earned a perfect score.381 The report also found
that 92 percent of Fortune 500 businesses include sexual orientation in their United States non-discrimination policies,
while 82 percent include gender identity.382 Generally, businesses with top CEI scores receive positive media attention,383
while those with low scores receive negative or disparaging media attention.384 Indeed, “businesses know that LGBTQ[+]
equality isn’t just the right thing to do, it makes them stronger
in our global economy.”385 In the absence of action by Congress or the Supreme Court, the private sector should continue
to lead the way by prioritizing non-discrimination policies for
employees, including those who identify as LGBTQ+.386 These
policies are not only beneficial for “form[ing] a more perfect
Union”387 but also for business.388
380

Id. at 8.
A total of 887 of the nation’s largest businesses participated in the CEI
report. Thus, nearly 60% of the businesses in the “CEI universe” earned a perfect
score. See id. at 4, 9.
382
The CEI report considers the policies and practices of both Fortune 500
participants and non-responders. A total of 327 of the Fortune 500 business
participated in the CEI report. The participating Fortune 500 businesses earned
an average rating of 91, while 199 of the 327 businesses earned a perfect score.
See id. at 6.
383
See, e.g., Curtis M. Wong, Here Are the Best Places to Work if You’re LGBT
in 2016, HUFFINGTON POST (Nov. 18, 2015, 5:04 PM), https://www.huffingtonpost.
comc/entry/corporate-equality-index_us_564cdd76e4b00b7997f8cac9 [https://
perma.cc/7DWP-BY2Y] (“Civic-minded consumers will have new incentive to frequent Starbucks, Hallmark and Nordstrom this holiday, as all three received top
rankings on the Human Rights Campaign’s annual Corporate Equality Index . . . .”); Susan Adams, The Best Big American Companies for LGBT Employees,
FORBES (Dec. 9, 2011, 3:29 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/susanadams/
2011/12/09/the-best-big-american-companies-for-lgbt-employees/ [https://
perma.cc/97ZP-2SR3] (“Chevron, Bank of America and AT&T all got top marks as
the best workplaces for lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender (LGBT) employees,
according to a survey released yesterday by the Human Rights Campaign . . . .”).
384
See, e.g., Amanda Chatel, 7 Companies That Don’t Support Gay Rights,
HUFFINGTON POST (Oct. 16, 2013, 5:08 PM), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/
2013/10/16/anti-gay-companies_n_4110344.html [https://perma.cc/4YT282ML] (“The United States Department of Labor may have ruled that all businesses in every state must provide benefit coverage for same-sex marriages, but
that doesn’t mean it’s going to put an end to homophobia. Here are 8 companies
that prove this to be true.”).
385
CEI 2017, supra note 379, at 2.
386
Cf. Lisa Fackler, In Gay Rights, Private Sector is ‘Unlikely Hero,’ Survey
Finds, LA TIMES (Aug. 14, 2002), http://articles.latimes.com/2002/aug/14/na
tion/na-gays14 [https://perma.cc/AW82-RBU9] (“Private industry is leading the
way in ending discrimination against [LGBTQ+] employees . . . .”).
387
U.S. CONST. pmbl.
388
Cf. Amber Phillips, How LGBT Activists Win in States Like Georgia: Emphasize Economics, Not Just Equality, WASH. POST (Mar. 28, 2016), https://www
.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2016/03/28/how-lgbt-activists-beat381
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Moreover, some commentators have proposed using a certification mark to indicate that a company or employer has
committed to the “exact substantive duties of ENDA.”389 The
certification mark, which takes the form of a symbol with an
“FE”390 inside a circle, announces to customers and employees
that the company or employer is committed to employment
non-discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation and gender identity.391 Employers and corporations gain the right to
use the mark only if they sign a licensing agreement agreeing to
follow the provisions of ENDA.392 The commentators note that
the certification mark is merely an “incremental strategy in the
struggle for equality.”393
The commentators also contend that the strategy will have
other beneficial effects.394 Privatizing ENDA using the certification mark has three additional benefits: (1) amelioration, (2)
demonstration, and (3) realignment.395 First, in states that do
not have robust workplace protections for LGBTQ+ individuals,
privatizing ENDA provides an ameliorative private right of action and legal remedy to unprotected workers who are discriminated against based on their sexual orientation or gender
identity.396 Second, companies and employers adopting the
mark will demonstrate to lawmakers the prudence of adopting
ENDA or the state equivalent as well as inform them about the
operational and litigation-related implications of the law.397
Third, the adoption of the mark by a significant number of
companies and employers may produce new opportunities eiback-unfriendly-laws-emphasize-economics-not-just-equality/?utm_term=.421
515b50acb [https://perma.cc/D2DV-7AAD] (“There’s a clear economic argument
for businesses to jump into [the] contentious social issue [of LGBTQ+ rights]. . . .
Corporations are acutely aware of their image among the coveted 18-34-year-old
category.”).
389
Ian Ayres & Jennifer Gerarda Brown, Mark(et)ing Nondiscrimination: Privatizing ENDA with a Certification Mark, 104 MICH. L. REV. 1639, 1641 (2006).
Certification marks can be quite influential in the marketplace. See, e.g., Roger D.
Wynne, The Emperor’s New Eco-Logos?: A Critical Review of the Scientific Certification Systems Environmental Report Card and the Green Seal Certification Mark
Programs, 14 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 51, 57 (1994) (“[The Green Seal’s] Certification Mark
could be an effective tool for influencing the purchase decisions of green and
latent green consumers, and thus for stimulating some changes from manufacturers eager to expand or protect market share.”).
390
“FE” stands for “Fair Employment.”
391
Ayres & Brown, supra note 389, at 1641.
392
Id.
393
Id.
394
See id. at 1641–42.
395
Id. at 1647.
396
Id.
397
Id. at 1648.

R

\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\104-1\CRN101.txt

284

unknown

Seq: 52

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

10-JAN-19

11:58

[Vol. 104:233

ther to compromise in Congress or state legislatures or to serve
as a “wedge issue” to pressure politicians to support ENDA.398
The proposal to privatize ENDA, however, can just as easily be
applied to the Equality Act in the context of employment discrimination and workplace protections.
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, South African non-discrimination and equal
protection law and jurisprudence should serve as a model for
the United States. The South African Constitution, South African Constitutional Court cases, and laws passed by the South
African Parliament all mandate that LGBTQ+ South Africans
be treated equally to their heterosexual counterparts. Discrimination against LGBTQ+ South Africans is expressly forbidden—including in the employment context. The United States
still lacks comprehensive federal employment non-discrimination laws or workplace protections for LGBTQ+ individuals.
Extending Title VII—either via court decision or by passing the
Equality Act—will provide robust workplace protections on the
basis of sexual orientation and gender identity. This approach
is the most effective way to close the gap between South African
non-discrimination and equal protection law and jurisprudence and that of the United States. In the meantime, South
Africa will be the proverbial “city upon a hill,”399 and the United
States will continue to abdicate its moral responsibility.
398

Id. at 1650.
John Winthrop, A Model of Christian Charity, WINTHROP SOC’Y, https://
www.winthropsociety.com/doc_charity.php [https://perma.cc/TVB9-RFAF]
(presenting a thesis written on board the ship Arbella in 1630); see also John F.
Kennedy, President-Elect, United States of America, Address at the General Court
of Massachusetts (Jan. 9, 1961) (“I have been guided by the standard John Winthrop set before his shipmates on the flagship Arbella three hundred and thirtyone years ago. . . . ‘We must always consider,’ he said, ‘that we shall be a city upon
a hill—the eyes of all people are upon us.’” (emphasis added)); Ronald Reagan,
President, United States of America, “A Vision for America” Election Eve Address
(Nov. 3, 1980) (“I have quoted John Winthrop’s words more than once upon the
campaign trail this year—for I believe that Americans in 1980 are every bit as
committed to that vision of a shining ‘city on a hill,’ as were those long ago
settlers . . . .” (emphasis added)); Barack Obama, U.S. Senator, Commencement
Address at the University of Massachusetts, Boston (June 2, 2006) (“As the earliest settlers arrived on the shores of Boston and Salem and Plymouth, they
dreamed of building a City upon a Hill. . . . I see students that have come here
from over 100 different countries, believing like those first settlers that they too
could find a home in this City on a Hill—that they too could find success in the
unlikeliest of places.” (emphasis added)); Mitt Romney, Address at the Hinckley
Institute of Politics at the University of Utah (Mar. 3, 2016) (“[Donald Trump’s]
domestic policies would lead to recession. His foreign policies would make
America and the world less safe. He has neither the temperament nor the judge399
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ment to be president. And his personal qualities would mean that America would
cease to be a shining city on a hill.” (emphasis added)).

